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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
During the period 3–8 October 2010, the United States Naval War College in Newport, 
Rhode Island hosted the Navy Title 10 Global Maritime Partnerships Game (GMPG, also 
Global ‗10), on a truly international scale (83 participants from 46 countries).  The 
overarching purpose of the GMPG was to help the Navy better understand the complexity of 
the problems that it could face throughout the maritime environment by identifying the 
catalysts to instability at the national, regional and cross-regional levels and the impediments 
to forming effective regional and global partnerships in the maritime domain from both 
United States and international perspectives.  This game could help the Navy better define 
the approaches necessary to establish maritime partnerships to address maritime security 
issues. 
While the Navy has multiple inputs to theater security cooperation plans in the different 
regions, there should be a better understanding of how and why these forces and capabilities 
are being used, where they are being used, and what is necessary to achieve the desired end 




The GMPG was structured to explore the following four specific objectives: 
• Identify maritime regional and cross-regional challenges (e.g., resource scarcity, 
epidemics and pandemics, and regional and transnational criminality) from both 
international and U.S. perspectives 
• Identify broad-based partnership requirements  (e.g., policy, legal, technological, etc.) 
that will enable Maritime Domain Awareness in order to counter these challenges 
• Provide an environment for participants to explore and appreciate the complexities of 
establishing and maintaining effective maritime partnerships through domestic and 
international perspectives 
• Provide participants with an opportunity to familiarize themselves with a sampling of 
current technological research and innovations in Maritime Domain Awareness. 
In order to address the mutually agreed upon objectives established by OPNAV N2/N6 and 
the Naval War College the following overarching research question is proffered in this game:  
• Based on the catalysts to instability derived from the participants, what were the 
impediments and proposed collaborative solutions to forming effective partnerships at the 
sub-regional, regional and cross regional levels from both United States and international 
perspectives? 
The Global ‘10 Game was designed to enhance participants‘ understanding of the 
complexities encountered in developing maritime partnerships, information sharing processes 






experiential and educational venue to explore with other nations various current regional 
approaches to MDA and then consider how partners might collaborate through new 
relationships, improved information sharing regimes and enhanced MDA in order to better 
solve the varied, yet often intractable, maritime problems in each region.  Additional 
understanding of these regional issues, which can become catalysts to regional and global 
instability, and the preferred solutions, informs US Navy and other maritime service decision 
making about maritime security from a US perspective (USC Title 10 requirement to: 
organize, train, equip). Research events in support of the game design can be found in 
Appendix C.  
For this descriptive game, the game design created a collegial atmosphere where the players 
could learn from each other, and enabled the perspectives and experiences of the players to 
be recorded for subsequent post-game analysis. At the conclusion of the game, the Data 
Collection and Analysis Team (DCAT) applied a variety of qualitative tools and techniques 
to aggregate data and identify key themes that may prove of interest to the sponsor for future 
research, policy making, and resourcing purposes. 
This was not a single, stand-alone game; but rather, was designed to be serial in nature along 
a research path paralleling development of international maritime partnerships.  This game 
draws on broad experience from other NWC games over the past several years that focused 
on the maritime security challenges, specifically:  MDA Connectivity Workshops, Global 
2008, Irregular Challenges Game 2010, MDA Operational Game, SEALIFT 2010 and the 
Multilateral War Game 2010. 
Analytical Findings and Recommendations:  
• To achieve global MDA through maritime partnerships, the United States should pursue 
involvement in all current regional MDA/partnership efforts.  By working to develop and 
mature the individual regional MDA/partnership solutions, the United States will become 
a trusted partner in sharing information and addressing the key issues upon which the 
regional nations are focused.  Participants expected that once the initial regional focus is 
successful, participating nations will be willing to expand their maritime partnerships 
beyond their immediate region. Connected regions would then be able to build broader, 
more comprehensive MDA partnership solutions.  MDA will grow from within one 
region and overlap neighboring regions, progressively providing a global solution to 
MDA and maritime partnerships.  
• Given the wide range of partnership barriers encountered by the international 
participants, the U.S. Navy should concentrate more of its efforts at the sub-regional and 
regional levels and work towards transforming bilateral arrangements into broader 
multilateral arrangements to achieve a more robust global maritime understanding.  A 
bottom-up vice top-down approach to address regional issues is preferred in each region 






• All navies and governments should work towards establishing standard processes, 
procedures and protocols for MDA networks, data exchange, and data classification at the 
national, sub-regional, regional and cross-regional levels.  This will of necessity be a 
lengthy, messy process.  Standard processes in one region will not be the same as in 
another region.  Only as regional growth leads to cross-regional linkages can conflicting 
processes be resolved in this preferred bottom-up solution. 
 Efforts should be focused to work within existing sub-regional and regional 
organizations (e.g., political – Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Indian Ocean 
Naval Symposium (IONS), African Union (AU), Economic Union of Central 
African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of Western African States 
(ECOWAS)), and leverage bilateral agreements as well as the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) on a case by case basis to facilitate standardization 
development at the regional and cross-regional levels.  
• In order to overcome the legal barriers of information sharing and maritime security 
operations, individual nations should work towards aligning domestic legislation through 
the adoption of international regulations.  
 Leverage existing models such as the Regional Cooperation Agreement on 
Combating Piracy and Armed Groups in Southeast Asia, Proliferation Security 
Initiative, and existing political organizations (EU, NATO, GCC, etc.) as 
proposed cooperative maritime security models.  
• All navies and governments should work towards increasing funding of non-technology 
aspects of partnership building (training, coalition conferences/seminars, and travel).  
Investments in relationship building should have a higher priority than investments in 
new systems and technology.  
 The U.S. Navy working with international partners should develop a GMP/MDA 
distant education initiative (e.g., web-enabled program, CD-ROM based 
correspondence program) whereby all U.S. and international maritime 
stakeholders (e.g., military, civilian, industry etc) would have access to a common 
resource database that provides literature, live news feeds and upcoming events 
on existing partnerships and MDA initiatives at the national, sub-regional, 
regional and cross-regional levels. Specific documentation noted by the players 
include MDA and GMP strategies, polices, laws, best practices, peer-reviewed 
articles, symposium briefings etc.  
 The U.S. Navy should enhance international military education and training 
funding (e.g., noted by players through Section 1206 and Combatant Commander 
funds) across all regions for those countries who seek to engage in international 






 All navies should leverage existing exercises and establish new exercises and 
training opportunities to enhance relationships.  Multiple regions preferred mil-to-
mil exercises as the first step to partnerships, but concluded that secure, long-
lasting partnerships would need to come through diplomatic relationships.     
 The Chief of Naval Operations should designate research and development funds 
over the next 5 years to improve information sharing processes and understanding 
of technological interoperability requirements through academic gaming and 
research. These funds would be separate funds dedicated towards advancing the 
theory and practice of Maritime Domain Awareness at the sub-regional regional 
and cross-regional levels.  
• The U.S. Navy should increase Navy Liaison Officer billets to meet the requirements of 
staffing and expanding maritime security partnerships focused at the sub-regional and 
regional levels.  
 Within the FAO program, seek to create an MDA focus or career track (e.g., 
education, training, and experience with international partners and industry). 
Personnel should work closely with key regional maritime stakeholders and U.S 
leadership on operational and strategic information sharing issues at the sub-
regional and regional levels.  
• Procure and install MDA infrastructure (shore radar, communications, port facilities, 
coordination centers, laboratory facilities, fixed and portable equipment), operational 
assets (e.g., patrol vessels and aircraft), and pursue education and training opportunities 
for both individual personnel and organizations to build partnerships.  
• Leverage and integrate existing regional and trans-regional technologies to share 
unclassified shipping data (VRMTC, MSSIS, REMIX, and SUCBAS etc). Work towards 
developing technological working groups to integrate existing MDA infrastructure and 
develop technical common standards at the national, sub-regional, regional and cross-
regional level.  Technical feasibility studies were suggested by the players as a 
mechanism to support these working groups.  
• All navies and governments should work towards fostering increased governmental 
appreciation of important maritime issues by developing a shared understanding of the 
importance of the ocean to a individual countries through building relationships with 
governmental leaders and increasing their maritime knowledge by providing them 
relevant maritime talking points, facts, briefing materials, articles, etc. 
• All MDA participants should focus MDA cooperation and coalitions around maritime 








2.1. Overview.  The War Gaming Department of the U.S. Naval War College hosted the 
Global Maritime Partnerships (GMP) Game, 3 - 8 October, 2010. The game was 
sponsored by OPNAV N2/N6 on behalf of the Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Gary 
Roughead. The game was held in McCarty Little Hall at the Naval War College in 
Newport, Rhode Island. 
The Global Maritime Partnerships Game featured 83 participants representing 46   
countries, all of which were selected based on their locations as well as their willingness 
to participate in a MDA-related information sharing experience. The following nations 
participated: Argentina, Australia , Azerbaijan,  Benin , Brazil,  Bulgaria,  Cameroon,  
Canada,  Chile , Colombia,  Ecuador,  Egypt , France,  Gabon,  Georgia,  Germany,  
Ghana,  Greece,  Guatemala,  India,  Israel, Italy,  Japan,  Kenya,  Lebanon,  Mexico,  
Morocco, Netherlands,  New Zealand,  Nigeria,  Oman,  Panama,  Pakistan,  Peru,  
Poland,  Saudi Arabia,  Senegal,  Singapore,  Spain,  Sweden,  Tanzania,  Togo, Turkey,  
Ukraine,  United Kingdom, and the United States (List of attendees available in 
Appendix A). 
2.2. Background. The U.S. Navy has embarked on an ambitious initiative to implement a 
new maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21
st
 Century Seapower (CS-21).  This 
is the first new U.S. Navy strategy that addresses the post-Cold War and post-9/11 
realities of global terrorism.  The new strategy is consistent with the National Security 
Strategy and the National Strategy for Maritime Security, as well as with other national 
guidance.  As a key part of this strategy, Global Maritime Partnerships (originally titled 
the 1000-ship Navy) is a key tenet of U.S. naval policy.   
Current and future efforts to bring about Global Maritime Partnerships must address the 
ongoing challenge of information sharing or Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).  
Information sharing will not only enhance the Navy‘s war fighting capabilities but will 
also help the Navy meet the two new core capabilities, maritime security and 
humanitarian assistance missions that are an integral part of the new maritime strategy. 
Information sharing and maritime partnerships create the environment to provide 
security and stability against WMD proliferation, piracy, weapons, illegal immigration, 
slavery, fishery violations and drugs in the maritime domain.  That security and stability 
has an effect on global economics.  
A maritime partnership is an association of maritime nations that participate in 
international commerce, each having a stake in security and freedom of the seas. The 
partnerships are necessary to confront the large, complex challenges and to maintain 







The purpose of Global ‘10 was to identify the catalysts to instability at the national, 
regional and cross-regional levels as well as the impediments to forming effective 
regional and global partnerships in the maritime domain from both United States and 
international perspectives.  
Understanding these impediments is important to Navy Title 10 (organize, train, equip) 
responsibilities because these catalysts to instability (including, but not limited to 
resource scarcity, epidemics and pandemics, and regional and transnational criminality) 
foster broad challenges to U.S. national security policy. The U.S. Navy plays a critical 
role in confronting such challenges through forward presence, deterrence, sea control, 
power projection, maritime security and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response 
(HA/DR). As emphasized by players in Global‗08 , such efforts cannot be sustained 
without effective regional and international engagement and cooperative maritime 
security partnerships (i.e., Maritime Domain Awareness).  
The Global Maritime Partnerships Game drew on the broad experiences from other 
NWC games that focused on the maritime security challenges, specifically:  Global ‘08, 
International Seapower Symposium (ISS) XIX, Irregular Challenges Game 2010, MDA 
Operational Game 2010, Strategic SEALIFT 2010 and the Multilateral War Game 2010. 
Each event reported consistent findings that maritime security issues can be best 
addressed through partnerships developed to counter the various instability factors that 
affect the global commons.  As CS-21 declares, cooperative relationships between 
nations contribute to a secure and stable maritime domain.  For a more detailed 
description of each of the referenced events, see Appendix B. 
2.3. Purpose of GMPG. Identify impediments to forming effective regional and global 
partnerships within the maritime domain from both international and U.S. perspectives. 
2.4. GMPG Objectives.  In support of the above purpose, there were four objectives: 
 Identify maritime regional and cross-regional challenges (e.g., resource scarcity, 
epidemics and pandemics, and regional and transnational criminality) from both 
international and U.S. perspectives. 
 Identify broad-based partnership requirements (e.g., policy, legal, technological, 
etc.) that will enable Maritime Domain Awareness in order to counter these 
challenges. 
 Provide an environment for participants to explore and appreciate the 
complexities of establishing and maintaining effective maritime partnerships 
through domestic and international perspectives. 
 Provide participants with an opportunity to familiarize themselves with a 







2.5 Research Questions 
One of the most important functions of gaming is to answer timely research questions 
posed by the sponsors. In order to do so, capturing data that is germane to a specific area 
of interest is critical, because successful data capture enables useful analysis and ensures 
a symbiotic relationship between game design and subsequent findings. 
Accordingly, it is important to remember that the role of any war game is to aid the 
sponsors, participants, and consumers of game results to investigate the processes of 
combat, strategy and human decision making not necessarily to calculate the outcome of 
a specific engagement. This was a highly inductive, descriptive game employing the 
qualitative methodology known as a case study. This research strategy investigated a 
phenomenon within its real-life context by employing in-depth, focused surveying and 
broader open-ended facilitation. This allowed researchers to explore causation in order to 
find underlying principles and reasoning behind participant actions.   
This game was unique in that the players, both military and civilian, identified the 
catalysts to instability, impediments, and proposed collaborative solutions through 
partnerships at the sub-regional, regional and cross-regional levels in order to improve 
maritime safety and security. The intent of identifying and then exploring catalysts to 
instability in the game design was to provide a rich, political-military environment that 
enabled each cell to explore a wide range of diplomatic, informational, military, and 
economic interactions for enabling partnerships at the sub-regional, regional, and cross-
regional levels. 
In order to address the mutually agreed upon objectives established by the OPNAV Staff 
sponsor and the Naval War College, the following overarching research question was 
developed for this game:  
 Based on the catalyst to instability derived from the participants, what were the 
impediments and proposed collaborative solutions to forming effective partnerships at 
the sub-regional, regional and cross-regional levels from both United States and 
international perspectives?   
The broad central question employed in this study examined the central phenomenon of 
"Global Maritime Partnerships".  The intent of this question was to decipher the complex 
set of factors surrounding the central phenomenon and present the varied perspectives or 
meanings that both U.S. and international participants hold. Because of the highly 
inductive, descriptive approach of this study, the central question explored in this game 
was intended to be broad in nature so that the data collection and analysis would not be 
limited. The subsequent descriptive and inferential sub-questions were designed to 
provide a greater level of depth to exploring this complex area of study. At a more 







 What did the international participants in this game consider to be the present-day 
catalysts to instability at the sub-regional, regional and cross-regional levels? 
 What did the U.S. participants in this game consider to be the present-day 
catalysts to instability at the sub-regional, regional and cross-regional levels? 
 What did the international participants in this game consider to be the 
impediments to forming maritime partnerships at the sub-regional, regional and cross-
regional levels? 
 What did the U.S. participants in this game consider to be the impediments to 
forming maritime partnerships at the sub-regional, regional and cross-regional levels? 
 What did the international participants in this game consider to be the solutions to 
forming maritime partnerships at the sub-regional, regional and cross-regional levels? 
 What did the U.S. participants in this game consider to be the solutions to forming 







3. GAME DESIGN & RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Game Design Introduction  
3.1.1. The Global Maritime Partnerships Game 2010 (GMPG) was designed to enhance 
participants‘ understanding of the complexities encountered in developing maritime 
partnerships, information sharing processes and Maritime Domain Awareness 
(MDA).  For the players, the game served as an experiential and educational venue 
to explore with other partner nations various current regional approaches to MDA 
and then consider how partners might collaborate through new relationships, 
improved information sharing regimes and enhanced MDA in order to better solve 
the varied, yet often intractable, maritime problems in each region.  Additional 
understanding of these regional issues, which can become catalysts to regional and 
global instability, and the preferred solutions, informs US Navy and other maritime 
service decision making about maritime security from a US perspective (USC Title 
10 requirement to: organize, train, equip).  Additionally, the game served as a 
vehicle for the War Gaming Department at the Naval War College to inductively 
generate knowledge in order to develop hypotheses that can be tested in future 
research.  Research events in support of the game design can be found in Appendix 
C.  
For this qualitative, descriptive game, the emphasis of game design was to both 
create a collegial atmosphere where the players could learn from each other, and to 
enable the perspectives and experiences of the players to be recorded for subsequent 
post-game analysis. Data was captured primarily through ethnographic (i.e., 
observed) collection by trained environmental recorders in the game cells and 
auditorium plenary sessions, through the group products developed by the players in 
the game cells and presented in the plenary sessions, and via self-declared player 
data and insights garnered through web-based, individual player structured surveys.  
At the conclusion of the game, the Data Collection and Analysis Team (DCAT) 
applied a variety of qualitative tools and techniques to aggregate data and identify 
key themes that may prove of interest to the sponsor for future research, policy 
making, and resourcing purposes.  
Collegial experience and individual surveys provided a rich understanding of the 
perspectives of the individual international players.  These perspectives provided 
well-developed regional overviews where the area of focus was well represented by 
international players.  When the sub-region was not adequately represented, cell 
focus became either blind or hyperopic.  To correct for these defects and better 
inform US maritime strategy and maritime security decision making, themes and 
data developed through other research efforts are triangulated with data developed 
in GMPG and deductively analyzed.  The broad themes and implications from 
several research paths become key trends, critical vectors, governing factors and 






3.2. Game Design.  To foster a player environment favorable to collegial interaction, the 
game was built around the perceived needs of the international participants (the game 
schedule is available in Appendix D).  GMPG was the first potentially large game where 
the preponderance of the players was international by design.  Invitations to over 100 
countries for 2 players each created the opportunity for and necessitated planning for a 
large event.  In addition to designed international collaboration by players, a separate US 
Government cell comprised of maritime stakeholders was expected to convene to listen 
to and learn from the efforts of the international players. 
The size of the international game cells was crafted to encourage robust dialogue in the 
cell.  Game cell size was targeted in the 10-12 player range, with a minimum of 7 and a 
maximum of 14 as design parameters.  The small size encouraged participation by all 
players while providing social space to fit the acknowledged diverse cultural norms of 
the players.  English was designated as the language for all events and appropriate 
language skills were requested of each international participant to enable the players to 
dialogue collegially without the additional burden of language translation. 
Each country was asked to send two players at the navy commander - captain, or army 
lieutenant colonel - colonel (action officer) level to the game.  Each was requested to be 
an MDA subject matter expert, with one player a member of the navy or coast guard 
(maritime services) and the second player from another government agency that is either 
a key contributor to MDA or key consumer of MDA information (e.g. customs, border 
security, port authorities, fisheries, maritime industry oversight, etc.).   
Forty-six countries sent 83 players to the game.  Two countries sent 4 participants, four 
countries sent 3 participants, twenty-three countries sent 2 participants and seventeen 
countries sent 1 participant.  Less than 10 percent of players were from outside the 
navy/coast guard (maritime agency) of their country.  Of those outside players, most 
were from border/customs agencies.  During the game the broad collegiality of the 
maritime services--sailors with common experience on the sea--was a noted asset; 
however, the additional intent to focus on the broad MDA process within and across 
counties—most MDA activity happens on land—was perhaps muted by the homogenous 
nature of the players.   
In addition to the 2 players in the international game cells from the United States, a 
separate US cell was comprised of 34 players representing maritime stakeholders with 
MDA equities from across the agencies of the government.  This ‗whole of government‘ 
cell was foremost chartered to engage in ‗active listening‘ throughout the week and 
convey to the international participants that the United States was sincerely listening to 
their issues, concerns and recommendations.  Having thoughtfully considered the 
international perspectives and input, the U.S. cell would begin to articulate the potential 
Title 10 implications of the international recommendations for the U.S. maritime 
services, and particularly the U.S. Navy.  Of note, due to travel requirements and other 






game to consider broader implications from the game, only half (16/34) of game 
participants were in attendance. 
The week was divided into three broad phases.  In the first phase the players focused on 
the current state of the maritime environment, both issues and implemented solutions.  In 
the second phase players built from the current set of maritime partnerships, information 
sharing regimes and MDA to develop better solutions to maritime problems and near-
term recommendations for solution implementation.  Immediately following the 
conclusion of the game, players had the opportunity in the third phase to attend an MDA 
technology symposium.   
Phase 1 began on Sunday.  Players were welcomed at a luncheon and received overview 
briefings about the week ahead.  Following the briefings, players were grouped into their 
prospective game cells with moderators to conduct initial introductions and complete 
initial individual baseline surveys.  Additionally, the moderator introduced the expected 
focus issue for initial cell work in phase 2 and determined if all players had an affinity 
for participation.  Phase 1 continued on Monday with regionally focused briefings on 
current implementations of maritime partnerships, information sharing regimes and 
MDA presented by current regional participants in those activities.  
Phase 2 consisted of small cell seminar work by the player teams and large group 
plenary panel presentations to present cell results to all participants.  On Tuesday, 
Wednesday and Thursday, seminars were led by an NWC moderator and assisted by an 
NWC facilitator to produce templated briefing products for plenary panel discussions.  
The plenary presentation product constituted the primary analytical output for the cell.  
At the conclusion of the seminar session, players took individual web-based surveys 
covering their seminar‘s work.   
Phase 2 plenary panel discussions were included to enable broad sharing of the work 
done in individual seminars.  Game Control focused plenary panel sessions on specific 
areas of interest from across the player cells.  These sessions not only enabled broad 
dissemination of the recommendations from the seminars, but also enabled constructive 
criticism and inclusion of additional ideas from the broader audience.  The Friday 
morning plenary panel was attended by VADM Dorsett, USN, OPNAV N2/N6, and he 
made concluding remarks at the end of the game to wrap-up the event and provide 
thanks to the players for their work. Player out briefs are available in Appendix E. 
Phase 3 introduced various MDA technologies to the participants on Friday afternoon.  
In short, group presentations in the auditorium, presenters demonstrated their technology 
to participants.  Additionally, some technology solutions were presented in smaller room 
settings.  The purpose was to demonstrate options available and not to market or endorse 
any specific technologies. Presentations were made by bith U.S. and international 
organizations. The technologies presented and the detailed descriptions of the overall 






3.3. Analytic Framing.  The overall analytic framing of the Global Maritime Partnerships 
Game 2010 consisted of an inductive, qualitative-descriptive process. The post-game 
analytic methodology follows a widely-used process referred to as triangulation. Current 
thinking in the field of social research suggests that a variety of analytic tools should be 
employed in behaviorally based activities such as war games, thus maximizing the 
credibility of the work. One widely accepted methodology that takes advantage of 
multiple techniques is triangulation. This approach allows the researcher to derive the 
same or very similar conclusions using different datasets or methods. Much of the 
strength of triangulation stems from its ability to distinguish between the 
idiosyncratic…and the representative.  Moreover, this method also allows the researcher 
to base inquiry in the assumptions being used and evaluate questions with the 
appropriate methodology, rather than the methodology driving the evaluation.  
Consistent with this approach, the thirteen data streams collected during this game (see 
Appendix H for details) incorporated a variety of research procedures into subsequent 
analysis. A brief description of each analytic tool follows. 
 Content Analysis: Described as a method whereby a researcher seeks objectively 
to describe the content of communication messages that people have previously 
produced, this approach involves identifying coherent and important examples and 
patterns in the data and subdividing data into coherent categories, patterns, and 
themes, as supported by player actions, comments, or White Cell assessment.  
 Grounded Theory: A more detailed and methodologically sound approach to 
analysis than the initial step of content analysis, grounded theory employs systematic, 
hierarchical procedures to develop inductively derived theory grounded in data. 
Grounded theory directs researchers to look for patterns in data so that they can make 
general statements about the examined data. For the purposes of this game‘s analysis, 
the Data Collection and Analysis Team employed an inductive, theory discovery 
methodology that allowed the researchers to develop a theoretical account of the 
general features of a topic while simultaneously grounding the account in empirical 
observations or data.  
 Data Visualization: Post game, by comparing and contrasting the players‘ 
activities in the areas of maritime security, stability operations, and building 
partnerships within the context of capabilities, benefits, and intended consequences, 
overlapping the Venn diagrams produced in the seminar game cells and developing 
link charts in i2 Text Chart and Analyst‘s Notebook, respectively, the Data Collection 
and Analysis Team was able to identify gaps, seams, and overlaps in U.S. Navy 
actions supporting other nations and organizations.  
3.4. Collection Approach.  The GMPG was constructed in a manner that ensured the 
overarching research question was adequately addressed. In order to do so, thirteen data 






These thirteen data streams analyzed in this game were deemed descriptive because they 
revealed the nature of certain situations, settings, processes, relationships and systems. 
Accordingly, they were aggregated and assessed in order to clarify the information that 
has been gathered. Lastly, quality assurance/quality control of the eleven international 
player cells and one U.S. cell datasets was conducted in order to ensure that consistency 
for coding and grounded induction was present.  
3.5. Identification of Independent and Dependent Variables.  The independent variables 
in this game are the impediments to forming partnerships at the sub-regional, regional 
and cross-regional levels, while the primary dependent variables are the solutions to 
forming partnerships at the sub-regional, regional and cross-regional levels.  
3.6. Definition of Key Term.   
Catalyst to Instability - For the purposes of this game, catalyst to instability is defined as 
anything that initiates, accelerates, or causes an event or series of events to adversely 









4.  ANALYSIS & RESULTS 
4.1. Themes, Insights & Implications   
Players, through an inductive reasoning process, derived a number of themes throughout 
the game and combined them on the final day of game play.  Then, the analysis team 
utilized a grounded theory approach whereby themes were identified through a process 
of constant comparison and then tested throughout the data.  The analysis team 
developed the implications and recommendations by exploring these player-derived 
themes and linking them to current literature in the area of international cooperation and 
information sharing (see Appendix I for sub-region/region cell analysis). Based on data 
grounded from the international participants during the game, this method attempts to 
inform leaders on the U.S. Navy‘s approach to maritime security cooperation and 
Maritime Domain Awareness.  
The insights discussed here result from an inductive reasoning approach and do not test a 
conclusive set of hypothetical actions that could be executed in a different context – for 
instance, in the real world or even in other scenarios. The underlying maritime issues, 
partnership linkages, and supporting activities were developed by experts with a 
significant understanding of the region and functional areas that were broad in nature 
and intend to inform Navy decisions concerning organizing, training, , and equipping the 
future Forces.  
Elements of Effective Strategic Partnerships  
The voluntary nature of partnerships was recognized by the players as a necessary 
characteristic for effective cooperation among international partners.  Partnerships can 
only occur as a result of an agreement, whether implied or formal, between two or more 
parties. Voluntary partnerships were noted by the players as a ―self-organizing process 
based on shared purpose and mutual trust.‖    
A common purpose or issue is needed as a pillar to forging new partnerships and 
maintaining existing ones.  This common purpose is formulated based on clear, common 
goals and must be mutually agreeable to all of the stakeholders involved.  Participants 
recognized the value of understanding the goals, motivations and approaches of all 
individual nations within the context of maritime security and information sharing.  One 
regional cell was unwilling to establish new partnerships in the game without the 
presence of other nations in the region. Having all parties involved ―early and often‖ was 
essential to optimizing the benefit of sharing information.  
Trust between all parties involved was derived as the foundation for enduring 
partnerships. Mutual trust significantly encourages the sharing of information and 
development of partnerships. The development of trust was viewed by the players as a 
long-term process unbounded by any certain period of time.  ―As time goes on, and a 






increase.‖  Trust was also believed to influence the confidence level between partners of 
their ability to safeguard and protect data across classification levels. Enhancing trust 
and partnerships between nations allows for disparate parties to coalesce into a 
cooperative security framework, increasing the number of beneficiaries and partners.   
Leveraging cooperative security frameworks in the maritime environment was highly 
desired and welcomed by all of the players. There was no single model found or 
developed that could be used in forming partnerships at the national, sub-regional, 
regional or cross-regional levels.  Many of the cooperative models that exist are centered 
on addressing a specific catalyst to instability or maritime issue.  More players were 
inclined to using an existing regional cooperative framework as a mechanism for sharing 
information and forging new partnerships, rather than developing a new model. 
Substantial support from organizations such as the IMO in assisting in the development 
of common standards, procedures and protocols for technology integration, data sharing 
processes, and classification levels was required. It was also recognized that there is a 
―long, drawn-out, time consuming political process‖ that accompanies this supportive 
mechanism.  The IMO was viewed as a necessary component in the long term stability 
and standardization of information sharing efforts at the regional and cross regional 
levels.  
95% of players concluded that commonly developed and agreed upon norms, decision 
rules, procedures, standards and protocols for information sharing at the national, sub-
regional, regional and cross-regional levels would assist their respective countries and 
regions to effectively address the demands and challenges it encounters in the maritime 
environment.  Throughout the game, the GMPG participants recognized that the lack of 
information sharing and coordination at the national, sub-regional, regional and cross-
regional levels is due to the lack of standardization of processes, procedures and 
protocols for MDA networks, data exchange, and data classification.  Standardization 
would help the coordination problem by forcing all parties to make mutually consistent 
decisions while realizing mutual gains. Competing definitions for information and 
intelligence were brought up often during the game as a major issue for sharing 
information.  An international regime can serve simply as an activity (PSI) or formal 
organization (NATO) in which stakeholders (e.g., people, organizations, and nations) 
can realize those mutual gains, but only by making mutually consistent decisions.  
When establishing an information sharing or maritime security initiative at any level, 
players leaned more towards the use of formal agreements, contracts or treaties.  The 
lack of standardization in each of the areas identified by the players was attributed to 
national laws, regulations and policies governing various matters such as economic 
―trade-secrets‖ (e.g. cargo manifest) , personal privacy (e.g., crew list) and national 
security (e.g. military vessels). These types of formal agreements were said to instill a 
stronger commitment to share because of the ―political top-cover‖ provided by 






reciprocal duties, responsibilities, and purposes of those involved.   Within each of the 
partnerships identified during the game, players determined there appeared to be 
sufficient national and international legal frameworks in place to support the 
development of partnerships initiatives. In order to overcome the legal barriers to 
information sharing and maritime security operations, players concluded that individual 
nations should align domestic legislation with international norms through the adoption 
of international regulations. The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy 
and Armed Groups in Southeast Asia and the Proliferation Security Initiative were noted 
by the players as ways which national legislation can be leveraged in support of 
maritime security cooperation.  As a result, maritime stakeholders would garner shared 
awareness and knowledge of the maritime domain.  
Shared awareness and knowledge was a common theme that emerged from the game. 
Knowledge sharing was an activity through which knowledge is exchanged among 
individuals, organizations or countries. Specifically, knowledge sharing was noted 
within the context of information (data), skills, and expertise acquired through 
education, training or experience. Accordingly, there was a strong emphasis on non-
technology aspects of partnership building, such as leveraging existing education, 
training, exercises and games as a mechanism for advancing partnerships and MDA.  
Specifically, the structure of these events should be tailored more at the sub-regional and 
regional levels with broad participation from military, civilian and industry stakeholders.  
Throughout the game, there was a need to bridge the gap between disparate knowledge 
to enable collaboration in the maritime environment.  Specifically, players learned about 
a variety of MDA and partnership initiatives that currently exist cross-regionally but, 
surprisingly, even though these initiatives existed within their own sub-regions and 
regions, they were unaware of the effort. Enhancing cooperation and coordination 
through the execution of these initiatives at all levels is critical to maximizing the 
sharing of data.    Within this context of disparate knowledge, sea-blindness was defined 
by the players, as ―a lack of political and public focus and understanding of important 
maritime issues, resulting in the maritime domain receiving low priority without 
appreciation for the consequences of neglect.‖ The lack of political awareness of these 
issues was derived as a primary reason for the limited amount of capacity and 
capabilities of nations to effectively address the diverse challenges encountered in the 
maritime environment.  
The lack of resources and funding significantly impairs sharing data and performing 
maritime security operations in the real world.  Specific capacity building opportunities 
that emerged from the game included the procurement and installation of MDA 
infrastructure (shore radar, communications, port facilities, coordination centers, 
laboratory facilities, fixed and portable equipment), operational assets (e.g., patrol 






personnel and organizations. The sustainment of robust programs and funding is an 
essential pillar to fostering continued growth of maritime security partnerships.  
The Role of technology in maritime cooperation was approached as an impediment to 
information sharing that is ―simplest to overcome‖.  However, while players felt that a 
bottom-up approach is essential to maximizing the amount of information contributed to 
MDA at the regional and cross-regional levels, they were still very much in support of 
establishing cross-regional information sharing linkages. Across all of the cells, players 
concluded that the amount of existing regional and trans-regional technologies were 
adequate to share unclassified data. Some regional cells still identified a strong desire for 
obtaining additional technological resources specifically in the areas of systems 
integration fusion and analysis and Common Operating Pictures (COP).  
The Range of Cooperative Strategies for Achieving Efficacy in MDA  
Players asserted that maximizing the contribution to Maritime Domain Awareness 
requires ―more of a bottom-up than top-down approach.‖ A greater emphasis at the sub-
regional and regional levels held true across all of the regional player cells. Specifically, 
the players felt that in order to share the full spectrum of maritime information at the 
sub-regional, regional and cross-regional levels, individual nations need to solve their 
domestic information sharing issues first, then systematically work towards the sub-
regional and regional levels. Players noted that most domestic and international 
information sharing partnerships are established as bilateral agreements. Individual 
player surveys indicated that 91% of the participants believed, ―based on three days of 
game play and reflection that the best solution to information sharing at the regional 
level is through multilateral agreements.‖ Similarly, 95% of the players indicated, 
―Based on three days of game play and reflection that the best solution to information 
sharing at the cross-regional level is through multilateral agreements.‖  
The game data showed through derivation that as the geographical scope of partnerships 
expands, the greatest contribution to Maritime Domain Awareness comes from 
expanding relationships and agreements from bilateral into multi-lateral.  Players noted 
that mil-mil relationships often initiate these partnerships.  The use of Navy LNO‘s and 
FAO‘s were highly desired and welcomed by majority of the players. Players concluded 
that an expansion of personnel in these roles would help meet the demands for 
establishing and enhancing partnerships worldwide. However, players concluded that the 
key to long term stability and cooperation is through diplomatic and political 
relationships.  The primary, long-term cooperative strategy to forming partnerships 
derived from the game, whether through bilateral or multilateral arrangements, was 
formal in nature. Players discussed this formality in terms of agreements, contracts, and 
treaties coupled with the use of national and international laws as necessary 
characteristics to establishing partnerships at any level.   
Players repeatedly recognized various national capability gaps and barriers to conducting 






technology interoperability, legislation, corruption, standard protocols and procedures. 
Moreover, the maturity level of interagency cooperation varied considerably across the 
wide range of participants. Even through the structure of the game required the players 
to operate within a certain geographical area; the players demonstrated a strong desire 
and commitment to continue pursuing cross-regional partnership initiatives, and as an 
example stated ―considering that no one-size-fits-all solution exists in maritime security 
cooperation, maritime stakeholders should continue pursuing a holistic approach to 
examining the specific challenges and stressors, social, cultural and legal phenomenon‘s 
that are unique at the sub-regional and regional levels.‖  
4.2. Title 10 Implications 
U.S. participants were asked to provide specific actionable recommendations for U.S. 
Navy Title 10 (organize, train and equip) responsibilities at the sub-regional, regional, or 
cross-regional levels. The section below discusses the overarching recommendations. 
Organize  
 Since 2005, the Global Maritime Partnerships Initiative has been well received 
from the international community and is still taking on a life of its own. Since its 
inception, the increase in multilateral cooperation in maritime security affairs has 
expanded across every region of the world. Nations have united both functionally 
and geographically to develop stronger partnerships by sharing maritime 
information in order to effectively address the catalysts to instability encountered 
in the maritime environment.  Work in this area should continue. 
 Establish sub-regional and regional liaison teams, assigned and manned by Naval 
Component Commands (NCCs), to provide persistent engagement in support of 
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, environmental response and search and rescue 
operations.  
 Establish Regional Maritime Operations Centers (RMOCs) in support of 
international maritime community interests.  Integration of information 
operations, international shipping companies, and multi-agency representation 
was noted as essential to ‗Integration . . . . was noted as essential‘ to enable 
effective regional efforts. 
 Define Maritime Security Operations and develop concepts of operations, 
doctrine and TTPs to perform various maritime security mission sets. Close 
collaboration with the USCG is vital to this effort. The project should build upon 
the CNO‘s Innovation Continuum Effort that examined Irregular Challenges in 
2009. 
 Incorporate overarching strategic guidance on theater security cooperation and 






should focus more on the governance and strategy of MDA at the sub-regional 
and regional levels.   
o International norms, decision rules, and procedures for sharing maritime 
related information at the cross-regional level, once developed, should be 
critical components of the U.S. MDA Concept. 
Train 
 Education is a key element for bridging the partnership gaps of U.S. and 
international participants at the sub-regional, regional and cross regional levels. 
The participants expressed a lack of knowledge of existing partnerships initiatives 
and specific lessons identified during the GMPG. The development of an online, 
interactive, professional maritime education initiative at the operational and 
strategic levels for U.S and international military, civilian and industry maritime 
stakeholders was recommended.  
 Additionally, U.S. players proposed developing a curriculum focused on maritime 
security (CTF Organization and Operations, MOC Watchstanding Procedures, 
MDA Principles and Procedures, Maritime Law Enforcement, Area Search 
Procedures, etc.) for U.S. Navy personnel. Naval Education and Training Security 
Assistance Field Activity (NETSAFA) was noted as one potential means for 
developing this educational and training initiative.  
 Leverage the existing Partnership Stations and existing bilateral and multilateral 
exercises to address as many maritime security issues as possible.  
 Increase interagency representation during training exercises. Specifically, 
incorporate civilian elements into exercises to foster synergy among international 
maritime stakeholders and better understanding specific roles, responsibilities and 
capabilities of each organization. 
Equip 
 Increase funding for the relational aspects of partnership building (games, 
exercises, training, and symposiums).  
 Provide funding for maritime operation centers and MDA technology at the sub-
regional, regional and cross-regional levels. Continue support to existing centers 
and technical infrastructures to improve information sharing processes and 
classification restrictions.  
 Provide additional funding and personnel in Foreign Disclosure Office programs. 
Additionally, expand and integrate FAO and LNO programs. In doing so, the 






 Examine the U.S. Navy‘s role, responsibilities, capabilities, and strategy for 
achieving efficacy in MDA at the sub-regional, regional and cross-regional levels. 
Accordingly, in order to develop commonly agreed upon norms, decision rules 
and processes at the national level, players concluded that a long term U.S. MDA 
research project be funded.  
4.3. Limitations of Game Design and Analysis 
One of the greatest challenges for the Naval War College, War Gaming Department is 
to develop a game that provides the robust insights into an issue or problem sought by 
the game‘s sponsor. Accordingly, managing stakeholder expectations about what the 
final game report will tell them with respect to broad-based implications is essential. 
Stakeholders often seek findings that will provide them with predictive conclusions 
for decision-making purposes. Unfortunately, gaming is a predominately descriptive 
process because games are not experiments. Even if a game is repeated, it lacks 
sufficient controls over player inputs and the central limit theorem for a distribution 
to ensure validity. In other words, sponsors should not attempt to draw inferences 
beyond what a specific group of players did in a particular game to yield 
generalizability (i.e., the ability to apply the findings observed for a small population 
to the broader world around us). 
Such is the case in the Global Maritime Partnerships Game 2010. This project was 
designed to be a highly inductive, lightly structured project analyzed primarily using 
open-ended, qualitative techniques. Specific themes were discerned as a result of 
post-game analysis, and gaps, overlaps, seams, and outliers were identified using 
grounded induction, content analysis, and data visualization. However, no 
inferentiality or generalizability can be assumed based on the results of this game. 
The value gained from the interpretation of insights derived from game play results 
from the ability to develop new kernels of theories concerning partnerships and 
information sharing.  From these new theories, hypotheses about implementing future 
cooperative security and information sharing models can be constructed and tested in 
future research efforts, such as through gaming. In this way, the inductive process 
conducting during the Global Maritime Partnerships Game 2010  will set the 
conditions to be tested in future deductive processes and games. 
Analysis effectiveness of a research effort, such as this game, can be measured in 
terms of the internal and external validity of the analysis.  Internal validity refers to 
the extent that cause-and-effect relationships identified in the game can be inferred 
from collected data.  External validity refers to the extent that the results in the game 
accurately reflect the external conditions in the real-world.  A number of potential 
threats to internal and external validity need to be accounted for and the analysis 






Two threats to internal validity were the quality of the data collected and the accuracy 
of the analytical technique used to review the data.  To ensure quality data collection, 
the analysis team primarily relied on player presentations.  These deliverables were 
captured via Microsoft PowerPoint and i2 Analyst Notebook during the discussions 
of the players participating in a collaborative effort.  The highly qualitative case study 
research method uses the participants‘ own words to provide data for analysis.  
Insights extracted from ethnographic recordings were then cross-checked 
(triangulation method of using multiple data sets) with other data sets collected during 
the game to ensure accuracy and conclusiveness.  To ensure the correct analytical 
technique was used, multiple methods and tools were employed (triangulation method 
of using multiple techniques) to review the same data.  These methods were content 
analysis, grounded theory, and data visualization.  Although internal validity threat 
mitigation strategies were used, the greatest limitation to developing insights and 
themes from the data resulted from the limited representation of regions as well as the 
diversity of the backgrounds of participants.  Their different lexicons and perspectives 
of the same situation, often including the use of English as a second language, add a 
level of difficulty to interpretation. 
To explore the degree of external validity, one must ask whether the data allows 
generalization to other subjects among the population.  To answer this inquiry, one 
must then look at the demographics data of the participants along with the specific 
cultural, social, economic and political phenomena tailored at the national and sub-
regional levels.  The game was designed to inspire innovative thinking given the 
complex nature of issues encountered in the maritime domain.    
4.4. International Participant Demographics 
There were 83 international participants from 46 different countries. 73 out of the 83 
participants successfully completed the individual player surveys. The average 
participant was approximately 46 years old and had approximately 25 years of 
service. The participants were overwhelmingly male (72 out of 73) and were 
predominantly military (69 out of 73).  Moreover, the median (25 years of service) is 
described as the numeric value separating the higher half of the sample population 
from the lower half.  
The intent of this game was to focus at the operational to strategic level of maritime 
security cooperation.  Therefore, it was desired for senior level participation from 
civilian and military organizations both in the U.S and internationally. All of the 
participants were college graduates with 60 percent reporting graduate degrees.  64 
percent of participants reported having attended a naval war college as part of their 










Figures 3.2 and 3.3 depict the highest education level and participation at a war college as part of 
professional military education respectively.   
 
 




Surface 27 26 
Law Enforcement 5 22.5 
Staff 3 25 
C4 ISR 2 27 
Expeditionary 1 27 
Anti-Surface 3 30 
Operations 8 27 
Aviation 1 19 
Maritime Domain Awareness 6 17 
Executive/Policy 7 24 
Technical  2 35 
















Other 7 18 
 
 
Table 3.4 depicts a breakdown of the participants relative to functional expertise with average years of 
experience for each functional area.  Although the average years experience for MDA experts were 
relatively low, players seemed well versed in the range of information sharing partnerships and initiatives 
that exists within their respective regions.   
 
Country # of players Country 
# of 
players 
African Union 1 Japan 4 
Argentina 1 Kenya 1 
Australia 1 Lebanon 1 
Azerbaijan 2 Libya 2 
Benin 2 Mexico 2 
Brazil 3 Morocco 2 
Bulgaria 2 Netherlands 1 
Cameroon 2 New Zealand 1 
Canada 2 Nigeria 1 
Chile 3 Oman 2 
Colombia 2 Pakistan 2 
Ecuador 2 Panama  1 
Egypt 1 Peru 1 
France 1 Poland 1 
Gabon 2 Saudi Arabia 3 
Georgia 1 Senegal 2 
Germany 2 Singapore 3 
Ghana 2 Spain 2 
Greece 1 Sweden 3 






India 1 Togo 2 
Israel 1 Turkey 2 
Italy 1 Ukraine 2 
  
United Kingdom 2 
Figure 3.5 depicts the diversity of countries and subsequent number of players involved in this 
research project. 
 
4.5. U.S. Participant Demographics  
There were 34 U.S. participants from various military services, USG agencies, and 
civilian organizations in this game.  28 out of the 34 U.S. participants successfully 
completed the individual player surveys. The average participant was approximately 
48 years old and had approximately 26 years of service. The participants were 
overwhelmingly male (26 out of 28) and were predominantly military (21 out of 28).  
Moreover, the median (26 years of service) is described as the numeric value 




Figure 3.6 depicts the distribution of military service, USG agency, and civilian organizations. 
 
The intent of this game was to focus at the operational to strategic level of maritime 
security cooperation.  Therefore, it was desired for senior level participation from 
civilian and military organizations both in the U.S and internationally. The majority 
of the U.S. participants were college graduates with 71 percent reporting graduate 
























Figures 3.7 and 3.8 depict the highest education level and participation at a war college as part of 
professional military education respectively.   
 
For the purposes of this game, the following definitions for regional and cultural were 
provided to the players.   
Regional Expertise: Basis of credibility of a person who is perceived to be 
knowledgeable in an area pertaining to a specific geographical location due to his 
or her study, training, or experience in the subject matter. 
Cultural Expertise: Basis of credibility of a person who is perceived to be 
knowledgeable in the social heritage of a group (organized community or society) 
due to his or her study, training, or experience in the subject matter.  Specifically, 
culture is a pattern of responses discovered, developed, or invented during the 
group's history of handling problems which arise from interactions among its 
members, and between them and their environment. These responses are 
considered the correct way to perceive, feel, think, and act, and are passed on to 
the new members through immersion and teaching. Culture determines what is 
acceptable or unacceptable, important or unimportant, right or wrong, workable or 
unworkable. It encompasses all learned and shared, explicit or tacit, assumptions, 
beliefs, knowledge, norms, and values, as well as attitudes, behavior, dress, and 
language. 
The Majority of the participants (25 out of the 28) reported having regional expertise. 
However, only 57% of the participants reported having cultural expertise. Players 
reported having a broad range of regional and cultural expertise. Players reported 























Figures 3.9 and 4.0 depict the regional and cultural areas expertise of the players.   
Players were grouped according to there respective regional and cultual areas of 
expertise. These cells were designed to mirror the international regional cells 
employed in the game and operated independently of one another. Each cell 
examined the observations, themes and receomndations from the international 
counterparts in their respective regions. To compensate for minimal expertise in the 
Middle East region (2), players with expertise in either Middle East or African affairs 
were grouped togeather. The lack of player expertise across every region with the 
exception of Latin America was a critical limitation of analysis.  
 
Figure 4.1 depicts the composition of the U.S. player regional sub-cells. Of note, 14 players (41%) of the 






































5. War Gaming Department Lessons Learned / Recommendations 
5.1. Administration and Logistics 
Lessons learned for the conduct of the Administration and Logistics portion of the 
GMPG is available in Appendix J. 
5.2. Future Events. 
Background.  Research throughout the past five years has indicated that the major 
impediments to information sharing, both internally within a country or internationally 
between countries has been the policy, legal and cultural issues vice the technological 
solutions often discussed.   
The realization of the fundamental concept that trust is essential to facilitate information 
exchange was recognized on a large scale at the International Seapower Symposium 
XIX held in Newport, Oct 2010.  Based on this finding and the results of the events 
described in Annex B, further study is warranted. 
Recommendations.  The following recommendations are submitted as a potential 
research tract to facilitate a greater understanding of the issues/requirements for the 
establishment of maritime domain awareness through maritime partnerships.  The 
recommended events are presented in two segments; first, a research path to improve 
U.S. MDA options and second, to capitalize on the regional issues discovered and 
facilitate greater cooperation between regional maritime forces. 
5.2.1. Future Games – U.S. Centric 
5.2.1. U.S. Interagency Game.  The intent of the event is to focus on the two new core 
capabilities from a Cooperative Strategy for 21
st
 Century Seapower. The U.S. 
Maritime Forces need to coordinate and cooperate internally to determine what is 
known and what can/should be shared. Interagency coordination is necessary for 
optimal sharing and there are multiple sharing channels requiring coordination.  The 
Navy plays a key role in MDA, but is only one of many participants.   
Domestic interagency challenges must be resolved in order to achieve the full 
potential of global information sharing; additionally, an improved understanding of 
interagency process is imperative in realizing the full potential of Navy capabilities.  
The following is an example of U.S. Government agencies that currently operate, at 
some level, information exchange ―systems‖ with their international counterparts 
but don‘t always coordinate the information or intelligence garnered throughout 
United States security channels. 
Organizations, such as DOS/NTRG (Nuclear Trafficking Response Group), 
DOS/DS (Diplomatic Security), DOE (Dept. of Energy), DHS/OPSP (Office of 






DHS/ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement), DHS/USCG(CG-531) (Office 
of Law Enforcement), DHS/USCG(CG-532) (Office of Counterterrorism & Defense 
Operations), DHS/USCG(CG-0941) (Office Of Maritime/International Law),  DOJ, 
DOJ/FBI(MSP),  DNI, HSC, NSC, DOD/JS/J5 (JAG), DOD/ASD(HD), DOD/JS/J3 
(DDAT/HD) (Deputy Director for Anti-Terrorism and Homeland Defense),  
DOD/OPNAV (N5SP) (Strategy/Policy Division),  DOD/USSTRATCOM,  
DOD/NCIS, DOD/OPNAV (N3OP), DOD/FFC,     DOD/JFCOM/J9,   
DOD/USNORTHCOM, should be considered for participation in the event. 
Proposed Objectives: 
 Examine the Interagency Intelligence architecture 
 Examine the terrorist incident response architecture from law enforcement to 
Federal response 
 Examine DOD and interagency coordination methodologies 
 Establish oversight considerations for national level information exchange 
coordination  
 Determine release methodologies for shared awareness programs established 
with regional partners 
5.3. 5.2.2 Future Games – Regionally Centric.  
The goal for improving national maritime capacity and to foster relationship 
building can be achieved by providing regional gatherings for international 
participants within their respective AOR.  Similar to the approach conducted for 
Eastern Africa with the Maritime Center of Excellence course of study, a one week 
regional game will provide an opportunity for more senior decision makers than 
were not available to travel to Newport, to gather, develop regional relationships 
and reflect on the following objectives: 
 Examine and evaluate a coordination structure.  
 Define standardized nomenclature/definitions for maritime security and 
humanitarian assistance mission areas.  
 Explore the processes for international cooperation.  
 Evaluate the current plans, agreements or procedures. 
 Examine legal authorities and jurisdictions. 
 Examine collaborative planning procedures to achieve a desired end state. 
Based on the interactions during the GMPG, the following regions expressed a desire 






 Gulf of Guinea Region. 
 Arabian Gulf Region. 
 Indian Ocean Region. 
o Eastern Indian Ocean Region. 
o Western Indian Ocean Region. 
 Mediterranean Sea Region. 
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Appendix B 
GMPG Background Maritime Security Games 
The Global Maritime Partnerships Game drew on the broad experiences from other NWC 
games over the past several years that focused on the maritime security challenges, 
specifically:  Maritime Domain Awareness Connectivity Workshop, Global 2008, 
International Seapower Symposium (ISS) XIX, Irregular Challenges Game 2010, MDA 
Operational Game 2010 and Strategic SEALIFT 2010. 
1. Maritime Domain Awareness Connectivity Workshop: 
a. During the period of 28 – 30 August, 2007, the MDA Connectivity Workshop 
convened to examine the following issues; 
i. Sharing interests and drivers of other maritime forces 
ii. Melding capabilities and capacities to maximize mission performance 
iii. Improving information sharing in a common domain 
b. The initial concept to develop a technology solution was superseded by issues of 
policy, legality and trust between the international participants.  Conclusions were 
that it was impossible to ―surge‖ trust and relationships should be developed prior 
to technological linkages. 
2. Global 2008: 
a. During the period 4-8 August 2008, the Navy‘s Title X War Game, Global ‘08, 
was held at the Naval War College (NWC) in Newport, Rhode Island. The game 
focused on developing insights regarding the capabilities, capacities, and risks 
associated with implementation of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower (CS 21).   
b. The observations and insights from the game were organized around seven 
maritime themes which had relevance across all of the cells. Three of the seven 
themes are briefly discussed below.  
i. Maritime Security: Game participants unanimously saw maritime security 
as an important mission, and it was a central focal point of game 
discussions. International players, in particular, considered maritime 
security primarily a law-enforcement rather than a counterterrorism 
function. Many of the participants also preferred U.S. assistance in the 
form of training and exercises. Finally, most participants perceived the 






enhance trust between the U.S. maritime services and their counterparts in 
other countries.   
ii. Building Partnerships: For game participants, building partnerships meant 
developing relationships with allies, friends, and stakeholders across the 
full spectrum of maritime activities in order to create trust and effectively 
accomplish shared maritime goals. They applied this concept of 
partnership across all regions, futures, and the full range of maritime 
activities, indicating that foreign partners wanted the U.S. to be involved 
with their maritime security in most conceivable futures. From that 
perspective, the participants noted that the United States will have to make 
significant investments in maritime resources on a global basis to build 
partnerships that meet the expectations of existing and potential partners. 
As participants and others have stated, ―you can’t surge trust.‖ Building 
partnerships will accordingly require tolerance, patience, and some 
willingness to adapt and conform to partner standards.  
iii. Shared Awareness: Virtually all of the players viewed information sharing 
between stakeholders (both governmental and non-governmental agencies 
and organizations) as vital to the development of improved situational 
awareness. They came up with five primary insights regarding shared 
awareness. First, information sharing is a key enabler, particularly for 
information-related concepts such as maritime domain awareness (MDA) 
and common operational picture (COP). Second, the barriers to the 
successful sharing and exchange of information are policy-related as well 
as technical, such that policy changes – not just technological advances – 
can lead to improved information sharing.  Third, trust, developed through 
engagement activities such as coalition exercises and operations, would 
help expand the range and depth of interaction between the United States 
and partner countries. Fourth, information sharing must be a two-way 
street. Finally, ISR, particularly persistent ISR provided by maritime 
forces, is a key maritime requirement. 
3. International Seapower Symposium XIX – The ISS is a biennial symposium held on even 
years to promote mutual understanding among the leaders of the world's maritime 
nations. 
a. During the period of 6-9 October 2010 ISS was conducted to raise awareness and 
increase Navies‘ participation in Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).  A focus 
of ISS XIX was the improvement of MDA and the broadening of information 
sharing between nations and navies in support of it. This was conducted through 
the following objectives. 
i. Endorse the importance of maritime domain awareness as a critical 






ii. Increase awareness of regional successes in maritime partnerships. 
iii. Build mutual trust and cooperation, and highlight best practices to mitigate 
and solve shared challenges.  
iv. Positively impact perceptions toward maritime domain awareness and 
enhance Navies willingness to share information as partners within their 
regions. 
b. The desired end state was a recognition of the need to take action on the 
following:  
i. To share information better and more widely,  
ii. To better integrate separate initiatives against various maritime threats 
(piracy, proliferation, trafficking, terror, illegal resource extraction, etc)  
iii. To gain better understanding of how different partners plan and operate 
through more cooperative training, exercises, and operations,  
iv. To create quicker, better mechanisms for those with capacity and 
capability resources to assist those who are still building, especially at a 
basic level, and  
v. To create or strengthen mechanisms for collective action where common 
maritime interests exist. 
c. Conclusions  
i. Political will must take the lead, technology and implementation will 
follow.  
ii. In addressing ―sea-blindness‖ (ignorance of the importance of the sea) and 
advancing cooperation and MDA, navies/maritime services should be 
leading the efforts to educate their governments/interagencies/populace on 
the importance of the maritime domain, the need to understand what is 
occurring there, and the need to cooperate with others to achieve a secure 
environment. 
iii. The path to increased MDA starts at the national level.  National efforts 
are then integrated into regional networks.  Substantial progress has been 
made in several regions of the world over the past 2 years in this effort.  
Trans-regional and global MDA will be achieved by expanding these 
existing regional networks and linking them together. 
4. Irregular Challenges 2010 Game 
a. During the period 27-30 July 2010, the United States Naval War College in 
Newport, Rhode Island hosted the Irregular Challenges 2010 Game. The 






better understand the complexity of the problems that it could face in unstable 
regions in the maritime environment and to better address how it could respond.   
b. The Irregular Challenges 2010 Game was structured to explore the following four 
specific objectives: 
i. Identify possible benefits and unintended consequences of U.S. Navy 
activities in maritime instability-oriented irregular challenges pre-crisis;  
ii. Identify possible benefits and unintended consequences of U.S. Navy 
activities in maritime instability-oriented irregular challenges during a 
crisis; 
iii. Identify gaps, seams, and overlaps in U.S. Navy capabilities supporting 
other nations and organizations in maritime instability-oriented operations; 
iv. Provide an environment for players to explore and appreciate the 
complexities of decision-making when faced with maritime instability-
oriented irregular challenges. 
c. According to the players, attributes that describe an effective approach to 
confronting irregular challenges include: 
i. Being focused on complex and interconnected problems; 
ii. Having the ability to address problems as a function of proper 
understanding of the complexity of the environment; 
iii. Having cultural expertise to help understand the complexity of the 
environment; 
iv. Awareness of available capabilities, both military and civilian, to better 
understand how to address the problems; 
v. Recognizing that problems are best addressed through pre-crisis activities; 
vi. Working with interagency, non-government, and international partners in 
order to address problems; and 
vii. Conducting unique missions to address problems such as building 
partnership capacity to conduct operations not normally associated with 







5. MDA Operational Game 2010 
a. In an effort to share ideas and initiatives that have been developed independently 
across the globe, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Roughead, 
stated during ISS XIX that an international game would be held at the Naval War 
College to explore the operational implications of MDA.   In July 2010, a game to 
enhance information sharing with international partners for Maritime Domain 
Awareness was held in McCarty Little Hall at the Naval War College in Newport, 
Rhode Island. 
b. The purpose of the event was to enhance information sharing with international 
partners for Maritime Domain Awareness in order to support International 
Seapower Symposium XX.  
c. Game Objectives. 
i. Examine regional MDA related relationships and networks in order to 
identify key elements of success, commonalities, and best practices. 
ii. Expose impediments to effective information sharing. 
iii. Identify options for broad based international maritime information 
sharing. 
d. Commonalities discovered during the game  
i. Maritime Domain Awareness is an accepted term.   
ii. Reasons for sharing information are to receive information through 
reciprocal sharing and improve capacity of sharing partners to take actions 
which support one‘s own national objectives (e.g., to interrupt in their own 
territory smuggling operations which affect both countries). 
iii. Interoperability within an information sharing coalition must be voluntary 
in nature.  Rules for sharing must be equally applied to all members and 
information assurance must be resolved to the satisfaction of each 
member.  
e. Impediments to information sharing. 
i. Lack of a national interagency process creates internal and external 
information sharing impediments. 
ii. Integration of legacy systems and technologies has been a significant 
internal challenge.  








6. Strategic Sealift 2010 
a. The SEALIFT 2010 Strategic Lift Game was conducted 2 - 6 August 2010 at the 
Naval War College, Newport, R.I.   
b. The intent for the game was to focus on the processes and procedures required to 
mobilize and deploy forces, equipment, and sustainment via the Joint Deployment 
and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) in support of Commander, United States 
Africa Command‘s Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) efforts in Western 
Africa as they support United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). 
c. Objectives 
i. Examine ―end-to-end‖ Department of Defense‘s (DOD) ability to support 
USAFRICOM‘s FHA Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and 
Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) 7200 in Western Africa.   
ii. Explore supporting relationships with partner nations, Governmental 
Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations, and other international 
agencies as directed, to develop and coordinate non-combat support 
operations. 
d. Conclusions.  
i. SEALIFT 2010 provided an excellent opportunity to explore the unique 
and challenging interagency relationships encountered during an FHA 
operation.  The close coordination with USAID/OFDA throughout the 
planning and execution of SEALIFT 2010 ensured the game related 
realistic and believable lessons and real world experiences to all 
participants.  Additionally, the game explored DoD-USAID/OFDA 
interfaces and how the international relief community responds to DoD 
involvement in crisis response, providing invaluable experience for all 
participants. 
7. Multilateral War Game 2010 
a. The Multilateral War Game 2010 was conducted 13-17 Sept 2010 at the Naval 
War College, Newport, R.I.   
b. The game‘s intent was to increase cooperation and interoperability among the 
navies of the participating nations and to examine issues of common concern in 







i. Examine the interaction between national-level political and military 
representatives and operational-level military planners, operating within a 
multinational context 
ii. Examine the ability of a multinational force (MNF) to effectively perform 
its assigned duties 
iii. Examine the impact of differing individual national legal policies, 
differing interpretations of international legal policies and agreements, and 
their potential impact on MNF operations  
iv. Examine military operational-level planning considerations when 
operating within a multinational force 
d. Conclusions 
i. Common understanding of MNF planning documents‘ terminology and 
phraseology is important for planners with different planning 
backgrounds.  
ii. Assigning actual forces to a notional C2 organizational structure requires a 
mature MNF ROE in order to consciously blend forces with varying 
nationally-imposed ROE restrictions  
iii. In addition to clear language translation concerns, an added complication 






















Research / Associated Events 
Background. The United States Navy has embarked on an ambitious initiative to 
implement a new maritime strategy.  This is the first new Navy strategy that addresses the 
post-Cold War and post-9/11 realities of global terrorism.  The new strategy is consistent 
with the National Security Strategy and the National Strategy for Maritime Security, as 
well as with other national level guidance.  As a key part of this strategy, the Global 
Maritime Partnership (originally titled the 1000-ship Navy) is a key tenet of U.S. naval 
policy.  The Navy must work seamlessly at sea with a wide range of 
international/coalition partners.  An impact to the requirements generation process for the 
Navy will be to ensure coalition interoperability is considered at the earliest stages of 
capability development. 
Current and future efforts to bring about Global Maritime Partnerships must address the 
ongoing challenge of information sharing or Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).  
Information sharing will not only enhance the Navy‘s war fighting capabilities but will 
also help the Navy meet the growing maritime security and humanitarian missions that 
are an integral part of the new maritime strategy. 
Information sharing and maritime partnerships create the environment to provide security 
and stability against WMD proliferation, piracy, weapons, illegal immigration, slavery, 
fishery violations and drugs in the maritime domain.  That security and stability effects 
the global economics.  
Maritime partnerships are an international association of maritime nations that participate 
in international commerce, each having a stake in security and freedom of the seas. The 
partnerships are necessary to confront the complex shared challenges and to maintain 
stability. Partners assist all countries in using the sea for lawful purposes including 
commerce.   
The purpose of the Global Maritime Partnerships Game (GMPG) was to identify the 
catalysts to instability at the national, regional and super-regional levels as well as the 
impediments to forming effective regional and global partnerships in the maritime 
domain from both U.S. and international perspectives. 
Research Tracks. Three perspectives were pursued to determine the regions, issues and 
participating nations that should be considered for the Global Maritime Partnerships 
Game.  They targeted the Department of Defense, Nation States and US Interagency 
organizations. 
Track 1. Research was conducted within the Department of Defense for the U.S. 






(CCDR), Naval Component Commands (NCC) and the Numbered Fleets to 
explore maritime security issues that existed within the Areas of Responsibility 
(AOR).   
In addition, research trips were conducted to the Office of Naval Intelligence 
(ONI) to conduct interviews with subject matter experts (SME) on maritime 
regions and issues (catalysts to instability) to identify impediments to forming 
effective regional and global partnerships within the maritime domain.  
This data along with the OPNAV survey was consolidated and applied to the 
construct of the Global Maritime Partnerships Game (as described in Appendix 
G). 
Track 2. Several international events were scheduled by the War Gaming 
Department (WGD) of the Naval War College (NWC) that made possible a 
research opportunity to examine issues and methodologies for application in the 
design of the GMPG.  
 Baku, Azerbaijan – The purpose was to expose the Azeri Naval forces to the 
operational planning process and putting into practice selected CONOPS to 
counter the maritime threat to the critical energy infrastructure.  
 Mombasa, Kenya - Provide operational level training that builds Maritime 
Safety and Security capacity in order to promote a stable and secure Africa 
and set the conditions for the region to harness the maritime domain‘s 
potential. 
 Montevideo, Uruguay - The purpose was to expose the Uruguayan Naval 
forces to the operational planning process and putting into practice selected 
CONOPS to counter maritime threats. 
 Cartagena, Colombia – The purpose was to achieve the goal of making the 
navies of South America aware of the benefits of and enabling them to 
participate in regional security initiatives.  The additional goals of enhancing 
understanding of how maritime domain awareness contributes to state and 
regional maritime safety/security and fostering navies determined to connect 
with partners and build maritime safety/security were a part of the game 
design. 
In addition, the process of determining linkages between information cells 
was part of the experimental design of the event. 
Track 3. Interagency organizations, though not part of the GMPG itself, were chosen to provide 
input to the game objectives and context. They were interviewed to determine their perspectives 








GMPG Schedule of Events 
Sunday 3 October 
1030 – 1130 Buses drop off participants at Officer‘s Club 
1030 – 1200 Participant Registration 
1130 – 1300 Lunch 
1130 – 1300 Welcome and Opening Remarks 
1300 – 1400 Game Design Brief 
1330 – 1430 Seminar Tables:  Individual Paper Surveys / Break 
1430 – 1500 Seminar Tables:  Participant Introductions 
1500 – 1630 Seminar Tables:  Group Issue Development 
1600 – 1700 Buses drop off participants at quarters 
1700 – 1800 Game Control Team Meeting 
1800 – 2300 Bus service to downtown Newport and quarters 
Monday 4 October 
0645 – 0730 Buses drop off participants at NWC McCarty Little Hall 
0700 – 0800 Late Participant Registration 
0700 – 0800 Breakfast 
0800 – 0815 Administrative Remarks 
0815 – 1000 Country Briefings (2) - Auditorium  
1000 – 1030 Break 
1030 – 1200 Country Briefings (2) - Auditorium 
1200 – 1330 Lunch 
1330 – 1500 Country Briefings (2) - Auditorium 
1500 – 1530 Break 
1530 – 1615 Country Briefing (1) – Auditorium 
1615 – 1630 Move to Seminar Gaming Cells 






1700 – 1800 Buses drop off participants at quarters 
1700 – 1800 Game Control Team Meeting 
1800 – 2300 Bus service to downtown Newport and quarters 
Tuesday, 5 October 
0645 – 0730 Buses drop off participants at NWC McCarty Little Hall 
0700 – 0800 Breakfast 
0800 – 0815 Administrative Remarks – Game Cells 
0815 – 1300 Seminar Working Groups – Game Cells  
1000 – 1030 Coffee Service Available 
1200 – 1330 Lunch 
1100 – 1300 Control Cell Plenary Panel Determinations 
1230 – 1330 Seminar Briefing Preparations – Game Cells 
1330 – 1500 Plenary Panel Discussion One - Auditorium 
1500 – 1530 Break 
1530 – 1645 Plenary Panel Discussion Two - Auditorium 
1645 – 1700 Administrative Remarks (Wednesday Seminar Assignments) 
1700 – 1800 Buses drop off participants at quarters 
1700 – 1800 Game Control Team Meeting 
1800 – 2300 Bus service to downtown Newport and quarters 
Wednesday, 6 October 
0645 – 0730 Buses drop off participants at NWC McCarty Little Hall 
0700 – 0800 Breakfast 
0800 – 0815 Administrative Remarks – Game Cells 
0815 – 1300 Seminar Working Groups – Game Cells  
1000 – 1030 Coffee Service Available 
1200 – 1330 Lunch 
1100 – 1300 Control Cell Plenary Panel Determinations 
1230 – 1330 Seminar Briefing Preparations – Game Cells 






1500 – 1530 Break 
1530 – 1645 Plenary Panel Discussion Four - Auditorium 
1645 – 1700 Administrative Remarks (Wednesday Seminar Assignments) 
1700 – 1800 Buses drop off participants at quarters 
1700 – 1800 Game Control Team Meeting 
1800 – 2300 Bus service to downtown Newport and quarters 
 
Thursday 7 October 
0645 – 0730 Buses drop off participants at NWC McCarty Little Hall 
0700 – 0800 Breakfast 
0800 – 0815 Administrative Remarks – Game Cells 
0815 – 1500 Seminar Working Groups – Game Cells  
1000 – 1030 Coffee Service Available 
1200 – 1330 Lunch 
1300 – 1500 Control Cell Plenary Panel Determinations 
1400 – 1530 Seminar Briefing Preparations – Game Cells 
1500 – 1530 Break 
1530 – 1645 Plenary Panel Discussion Five - Auditorium 
1645 – 1700 Administrative Remarks (Wednesday Seminar Assignments) 
1700 – 1800 Buses drop off participants at quarters 
1700 – 1800 Game Control Team Meeting 
1800 – 2300 Bus service to downtown Newport and quarters 
Friday 8 October 
0645 – 0730 Buses drop off participants at NWC McCarty Little Hall 
0700 – 0800 Breakfast 
0800 – 0815 US Seminar Presentation - Auditorium  
0815 – 0945 Plenary Panel Discussion Six - Auditorium  
0945 – 1015 Break / Coffee Service Available 






1200 – 1300 Lunch – Officer‘s Club 
1245 – 1315 Transition Remarks  
1330 – 1630 Technology Symposium – McCarty Little Hall 
1330 – 1530 US Seminar Plenary Session – Decision Support Center 
1330 – 1530 War Gaming Department Plenary Session – MLH 110 
1645 – 1700 Administrative Remarks (Wednesday Seminar Assignments) 
1630 – 1730 Buses drop off participants at quarters 



























Appendix E   
GMPG Cell Outbriefs 



























































































































































































































































Cell 6 – Did Not Exist 












































































































































































































































































Background.  Throughout the development of the Global Maritime Partnerships Game, the 
desire to investigate technological systems to facilitate information sharing was prevalent in 
every discussion.  As a result of the planning process, the design of the game was conducted as a 
technologically agnostic event to allow the participants to investigate the legal, policy and 
cultural implications to Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) as a precursor to actively 
determining the preferred information exchange system. 
The objective of the Technology Symposium was to expose GMPG participants to a variety of 
international MDA technologies, and showcase selected regional MDA information sharing 
initiatives.   The technology initiatives that the War Gaming Department (WGD) selected were 
to show the participants how they could rapidly deploy low cost sharing systems using existing 
AIS data sources.  The two sources of data that are currently available on line, for little and no 
cost are the Maritime Safety & Security Information System (MSSIS) and the U.S. Department 
of Transportation Maritime Administration‘s MarView.  The national ―cost of admission‖ to 
receive this data is simply to agree to share its own data into the system.  Other systems 
presented ideas on how to share data from commercial satellites. 
Symposium. NWC did not want to endorse nor support any one system over another; therefore, 
the symposium format provided organizations the opportunity to demonstrate their systems to 
those interested.  In short group presentations in the auditorium, presenters demonstrated their 
technology to participants.  Additionally, some technology solutions were presented in more 
intimate room settings.  The systems demonstrated during the Symposium were as follows (for a 
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Annex 1 to Appendix F 
Technology Symposium - Systems 
CAMTES (iBench – Greenline Systems) – Computer Assisted Maritime Threat Evaluation 
System  
 
GreenLine iBenchTM helps analysts and decision-makers make better and more efficient 
risk assessments and interdiction decisions. Complementing existing Command and 
Control Systems (C2) with operational analysis,  iBench is a comprehensive decision-
support platform that leverages the different sub-sets of illicit, natural, and normal 
maritime activities to provide a clearer understanding of the actors, assets and actions 
occurring daily. By providing an unclassified and open-source backbone for information 
sharing, iBench enhances MDA and MSA operations and assists in inter-agency and 
coalition collaboration. 
A computer-based threat evaluation system, together with any other complementary, 
associated, supporting, or bundled programs, that will analyze ocean-going cargo vessels 
for security implications in support of a comprehensive maritime domain awareness 
effort. The system will utilize business rules developed in collaboration with 
coalition/alliance partners, and approved by the US Navy, and access external data in 
order to produce accurate, in-depth, and reliable threat evaluation and analysis as well as 
realistic and practical recommendations for interdiction, boarding, or other appropriate 
action. 
C-SIGMA – Collaboration in Space for International Global Maritime Awareness 
All maritime nations of the world, working together, can make the seas much safer and 
more secure from wrong-doers, be they smugglers, polluters or pirates.  One of the 
primary steps the nations could take would be to create a global space partnership (GSP) 
initially focused on the maritime domain using commercial and civil satellites. 
    
This system intends to add significant situational awareness data to a common 
operational picture on a global scale by combining terrestrial maritime surveillance 
systems with commercial and civilian space systems having significant earth and ocean 
observation capabilities. This capability would be distinct and totally separate from any 
classified undertakings either now underway or planned and would have the huge benefit 
of being able to be shared with all seafaring nations of the world. 
MarView – Maritime View 
The U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration is the owner of 
MarView, an integrated data-driven environment providing essential information to 
support the strategic requirement of the U.S. Marine Transportation System (MTS) and 






fuse data together to create models and simulations for capacity planning, economic 
impact analysis, on-demand forecasting, and plans for mitigating/reacting to emergency 
situations. 
MSSIS - The Maritime Safety and Security Information System  
The Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS) is a freely-shared, 
unclassified, near real-time data collection and distribution network. Its member countries 
share data from Automatic Identification Systems, coastal radar, and other maritime-
related systems.  MSSIS is intended to promote multilateral collaboration and data-
sharing among international participants, with a primary goal of increasing maritime 
security and safety. Data sources may range from a single sensor to an entire national 
vessel tracking network. MSSIS is perfectly suitable as a one-stop source for streaming 
global maritime data. Because the data distributed by MSSIS maintains its original, 
internationally recognized format and is delivered to users in near real time, member 
organizations are able to utilize the data feed to meet their specific mission requirements. 
SISTRAM – The Maritime Information Traffic System 
The purpose of SISTRAM is to improve SAR efforts within the Brazilian maritime area. 
This is accomplished by gathering navigational information from participating vessels. 
This information is then used during an SAR effort to route nearby vessels to the scene. 
The ability to quickly divert nearby vessels to the scene provides faster response than can 
be provided from shore and increases the safety of life at sea.  Its interlink with the AIS 
project has improved the quality of information and increased the precision of follow-
ups, making them an important Command, Control and Intelligence (C²I) tool, as several 
sources of information are integrated into the system in its constant evolution. 
 
SUCBAS – Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea 
 
The target for SUCBAS is to improve MSA in the heterogeneous environment of the 
Baltic Sea. This presentation deals with the technology and how the cooperating 
countries (without a common funding source) design, develop and implement new 
functionality using agile principles and specifications from TIDE (Technology for 
Information, Decision and Execution superiority). 
SUCBAS is not a physical system or a machine. SUCBAS is a Maritime Domain 
Awareness co-operation framework/process between countries in the Baltic Sea Area.  
SUCBAS was aimed to develop a concept with a technical solution, in order to enhance 
the Maritime Domain Awareness in the following areas: territorial integrity, safety, 
environment and maritime economy, through sharing information between the agencies 







VRMTC-A – Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Center – Americas 
 
VRMTC-A is an interagency, multi-national project to integrate partner nation efforts 
that address maritime threats in the Americas. This mission is accomplished through 
information sharing using a regional network and fused COP, analysis through analytical 

































1. The GMPG was a six day, international collegial event.  The overall tenor and tone of the 
event were designed to both showcase international perspectives and efforts in focus areas, 
and present them in an atmosphere that encouraged friendship development and collaboration 
at individual, group, country and regional levels.  For the GMPG participants, this event was 
an educational and collaborative event focused on maritime partnerships, information sharing 
and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).  MDA, while important, was primarily a focus 
area that enabled a necessary narrowing of focus from the much broader possibilities of 
maritime partnerships and information sharing that the participants might have otherwise 
reasonably considered.   
2. For the Naval War College, War Gaming Department, this event was analytical, with post-
event analysis providing insight into the current status of maritime partnerships and 
information sharing for the purpose of developing MDA that can better enable the CNO to 
execute his Title X responsibilities in support of MDA as an enabler of critical naval 
missions. 
3. The GMPG took place 3 – 8 October 2010 at the Naval War College in Newport, RI and the 
event week was divided into three general phases.   
a. The first phase entailed establishing a collegial, collaborative atmosphere amongst the 
participants and conducting dialogue to determine the primary maritime issues that are of 
concern to participants.  Additionally, various participants briefed the status of MDA 
efforts that their country and region are pursuing.  Team-building dialogue occurred on 
Sunday and country MDA briefings were given on Monday.  See Appendix  A for a 
listing of participants. 
1) The second phase was an examination of the policies, processes and procedures 
required to establish the information sharing and partnerships required to successfully 
counter the maritime issues that had been developed in Phase 1.  Phase 2 employed 
the developed issues with additional scene-setting background information as 
catalysts, enabling participants to work together in small-group seminars to mitigate 
the identified issues and problems. 
(a) On Tuesday, seminars individually developed operational-strategic level solutions 
(i.e. policies, processes and procedures) to the specific issue/scene-setter and 
presented those solutions in large-group plenary (selected seminars in moderated 
panel discussions).  Tuesday issues were focused at the sub-regional level (e.g. 






(b) On Wednesday, seminars individually developed operational-strategic level 
solutions (i.e. policies, processes and procedures) to the specific issue/scene-setter 
and presented those solutions in large-group plenary (moderated panel 
discussions).  Wednesday issues were focused at the super-regional or  functional 
level (e.g. narcotics trafficking from South America via Africa to Europe; 
narcotics trafficking from Makran Coast via Africa or Middle East to Europe; 
piracy; Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) fishing; pollution; Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS)).   
(c) On Thursday, seminars individually developed operational-strategic level 
solutions to enable MDA on an ongoing, enduring basis across a range of 
uncertain or changing issues and presented these solutions in large-group plenary, 
moderated panel discussions on Thursday afternoon and Friday morning.  
Thursday seminars were sized, grouped and focused on the near-term potential 
way ahead for the participants.  Additional key seminar deliverables included the 
major impediments or problems that must be overcome and a recommended way 
ahead including next steps and early success enablers.  Thursday‘s plenary session 
focused on major impediments and Friday morning plenary sessions focused on 
the way ahead. 
(d) A U.S. Government seminar with representation that is heavily Department of 
Defense, but broadly inclusive of MDA stakeholders convened Tuesday through 
Thursday in similar fashion to the international seminars.  The responsibilities of 
the US seminar were to: 
(a) Listen to and interpret international participant's products and presentations to 
gain additional understanding of international perspectives on various issues. 
(b) Demonstrate an understanding of international perspectives through a plenary 
presentation on Friday morning as a precursor to the way-ahead panel 
discussions. 
(c) Develop broad USG implications, based on the international presentations; 
with a specific focus on the Title X implications for the US maritime services 
(USN, USMC, USCG). 
(d) On Friday afternoon, the USG seminar concluded in a separate plenary 
session in the DSC in order to: 






(ii) Identify and capture additional understanding and insight based on the 
international ways-ahead that were prepared in seminars on Thursday and 
presented in panel discussion Friday morning. 
(iii)Identify the Title X (USN/USMC/USCG) and broad USG implications of 
the international way ahead. 
(e) Upon completion of the USG plenary WebIQ session in the McCarty Little 
Hall Decision Support Center, US participants adjourned to participate in the 
Technology Symposium. 
(e) On Friday afternoon, the NWC faculty and staff supporting the event seminars 
and plenary sessions convened in plenary session to capture the impressions of the 
moderators and facilitators of the event. 
(a) Key insights on international perspectives. 
(b) Broad USG implications. 
(c) Title X implications for maritime services (USN/USMC/USCG). 
(d) Recommendations for future areas of study and pathway events. 
2) The third phase was an associated symposium.  Following a GMPG concluding 
luncheon on Friday, participants were encouraged in Phase 3 to participate in an 
MDA Technology Symposium in McCarty Little Hall.  The symposium consisted of 
both auditorium presentations and trade-show type ‗booths‘ in the game cells around 
the auditorium.  The completion of the symposium concluded all events associated 
with the GMPG. 
b. On Monday morning, 11 October, War Gaming Department convened to hot-wash the 
conduct of the GMPG and capture lessons for incorporation in future efforts. 
4. Game Design 
a. GPMG 2010 was conducted as a single-sided seminar-style analytical game with a 
control cell. 
1) International seminars consisted of small groups (ideally 8-10, maximum 14) of 
international participants with an NWC moderator, facilitator and environmental 






2) The USG seminar was a larger group (30-45 planned personnel) of all other US 
participants.  They were moderated and facilitated by multiple NWC personnel to 
develop required deliverables and capture necessary data for post-game analysis. 
3) The Control Cell monitored the activities of the individual seminars in order to 
modify the schedule as required, assist individual cells where needed, and determine 
from the work being conducted in the cells the topics for, moderator(s) of, and 
panelists for the various plenary sessions. 
b. A simplified organizational structure overview is provided in figures 1 and 2. 
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5. Game Mechanics: The game broadly functioned to enable a collegial and collaborative 
atmosphere for international participants.  US participants were afforded the best opportunity 
to observe collegially the work of their international colleagues.  Seminars produced 
templated briefing products for viewing by all participants.  Individuals were asked 
individual survey questions to gain additional or analytic insight into their perspective. 
a. Phase 1 
1) On Sunday, as designed, participants were to be grouped at tables with their seminar 
moderator.  Each participant was to complete a paper survey and the seminar 
moderator would then complete an initial survey for the entire seminar.  The 
moderator would take additional notes to record key points and insights where 
possible.  A change in the schedule at the Officer‘s Club resulted in changes to the 
design.  Players were divided into their gaming seminars on Sunday and they were 
able to take their initial surveys via computer web-based means vice paper surveys as 
planned.   
2) On Monday, environmental recorders participated in plenary session for the country 
MDA presentations to capture additional discussion and insights.  All NWC 
personnel were encouraged to capture key items for data analysis.  
b. Phase 2 
1) On Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday, seminars were led by an NWC moderator 
and assisted by an NWC facilitator to produce a template briefing product for plenary 
panel discussion.  The plenary output product constituted the primary analytical 
output for the cell.  Additionally, moderator, facilitator and data collector notes 
captured additional information about the process of producing the cell output (where 
possible).  Toward the end of the seminar session, players took individual player 
surveys via computer (most players).  The Control Cell viewed intermediate or 
working products as they were developed to assist in determining topics for plenary 
panel presentation.   
2) The Control Cell designated the plenary panel topic and the NWC panel moderator.  
Designated participants (briefers), chosen by their seminar, participated as panelists in 
the plenary panels and presented the seminar‘s work to the plenary audience of all 
participants. 
c. Phase 3 
1) On Friday afternoon, the USG seminar was led by a moderator through a WebIQ 
facilitated plenary session in the DSC to develop the necessary game material for 






international ways-ahead, Title X implications for maritime services 
(USN/USMC/USCG), and recommendations for future areas of study and pathway 
events). 
2) On Friday afternoon, the NWC faculty and staff supporting the event seminars and 
plenary sessions convened in plenary session to capture the impressions of the 
moderators and facilitators of the event (key insights on international perspectives, 
broad USG implications, Title X implications for maritime services 
(USN/USMC/USCG), and recommendations for future areas of study and pathway 
events).  The faculty impressions were used in the analytical process to perhaps point 
to an insight from a player or seminar that might otherwise be missed.  NWC 
impressions were not analyzed as a data stream from the event. 
6. Game Considerations.   
a. GMPG was fundamentally structured and designed to enable the US participants to listen 
to and learn from the international participants. 
b. International participants embodied a broad range of cultural and social norms and many 
spoke English as a second language.  In previous events, some international players have 
shown deference to their American hosts when in Newport and let the host country (US) 
‘take the lead’ in developing plans and stating opinions.  
c. US participants, specifically USN/DOD, are seldom reserved and often attempt to take 
the lead in games and events, a characteristic that may be accentuated by the ‘home turf’ 
of Newport. 
d. All countries invited to ISS XIX were invited to GMPG and may choose to attend.   
7. Game Assumptions.  
a. The game was unclassified and executed as a self-contained event in McCarty-Little Hall, 
US Naval War College, Newport, RI.  
b. The GMPG was conducted in the English language. 
8. Game Design Concept   
a. Tasks that needed to be performed during the game to meet the game objectives: 
1) Seminar-forming task must be immediately accomplished. 
2) International seminars must surface and focus on key maritime issues to inform 






3) International seminars must present their work products to the assembled audience. 
4) Individual player perspectives must be obtained to understand the full range of 
viewpoints. 
5) Group seminar products must be captured by the Control Cell. 
6) USG seminar must be enabled to listen and understand international perspectives. 
7) USG seminar must present their work product to the assembled audience. 
8) USG seminar must determine the Title X implications for the maritime services of the 
international way-ahead as developed by the participants. 
9) Control Cell must determine themes, briefing seminars and moderator for each 
plenary panel discussion. 
b. Gaming procedures/mechanisms used to perform these tasks: 
1) These tasks were accomplished through moderator lead seminar style discussions 
drawing on individual player expertise. 
2) Game products were in the form of plenary briefings using electronic, formatted 
templates, electronic spreadsheet/database compilation of individual participant 
surveys, WebIQ groupware, and paper format surveys/templates when necessary or as 
required as a back-up format.   These were used to compile intermediate work 
products and final presentations in such a way as to preserve the deliberate and linked 
nature of issue (problem to solve) to mission (solve identified problems) to capability 
(inherent to the solutions). 
c. The specific steps required to outline the game’s structure: 
1) This was a one-sided, moderator-led multi-seminar event.  Participants consisted of 
multi-national players from military and government organizations, primarily naval, 
and US participants representing governmental departments and organizations that 
are Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) stakeholders, optimally.   
2) Participants in small-group seminars developed a collaborative response to the focus 
issue presented to the group.  Individual perspectives, dissenting opinions, and other 
insights not captured through the seminar brief were captured through individual 






3) The Control Cell monitored the creation of all seminar products and determined 
themes, panel moderators, and seminar cell panelists for each plenary panel 
discussion.   
4) Topical plenary panels focused on specific themes and led by a moderator presented 
the work of each of the selected seminars in turn.  Once all the panelists briefed the 
work done by their seminar, the moderator asked questions to broaden or focus the 
discussion and recognized participants from the audience to ask further questions or 





























Data Collection and Analysis 
 
I. Introduction 
One of the most important functions of the U.S. Naval War College, War Gaming Department 
(WGD) is to answer timely research questions posed by game sponsors. In order to do so, 
capturing data that is germane to the sponsor‘s specific area of interest is critical, because 
successful data capture enables useful analysis and ensures a symbiotic relationship between 
game design and subsequent findings. In order to ensure that data collection methods and 
analytic techniques are relevant to the game objectives for the 2010 Global Maritime 
Partnerships Game (GMPG or Global ‗10), a Data Collection and Analysis Plan (DCAP) was 
developed and is presented here as executed. The U.S. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 
through his staff element OPNAV N2/N6, is the sponsor for this project.  
It is important to note that the GMPG was a highly inductive, qualitative activity using mixed 
methods (i.e., triangulation
i
) and employing decidedly phenomenological analytical techniques. 
As a phenomenological research project, post-game analysis for GMPG sought to ―describe and 
interpret the experience of people in order to understand the essence of the experience as 
perceived by those studied‖
ii
. Specifically, phenomenological research focuses on participant 
perspectives. These participant (i.e., game player) perspectives are garnered through ―extensive, 
in-depth, unstructured interviews‖
iii
. Accordingly, the GMPG differs from other recent WGD 
projects in that the analytic process employed herein relied far more on ethnographic
iv
 (i.e., 
observed) data captured by ethnographers and technographers in the game seminar cells, as well 
as self-declared player insights observed during game play, rather than analysis conducted by 
subject matter experts after the game  concluded. In essence, both U.S. and international 
participants provided their own cell-based analysis of the national, regional and cross-regional 
catalysts to instability, and the impediments to forming effective regional and cross-regional 
partnerships within the maritime domain, as well as proposed solutions to mitigate those issues. 
At the conclusion of the game, the Data Collection and Analysis Team (DCAT) applied a variety 
of qualitative content and context tools and techniques to aggregate data and identify key themes 
that may prove of interest to the sponsor for future research, policy making, and resourcing.    
 
II. Game Purpose 
Today's world presents many opportunities and challenges for humankind.  Globalization, man-
led change around the entire planet, has led to more robust access to raw materials, human 
capital resources, the methods and means of production, and established and emerging markets. 
However, a negative impact of globalization has been the relative advantage that empowered 
nations, organizations and groups with means have employed to exploit the weaknesses in 






disempowered nations.  While maritime theft, piracy, illegal fishing, and pollution are examples 
of overt exploitive acts occurring in the littorals, additional complex issues such as human 
smuggling, illicit drug trafficking, and gun running are also connected to the seascape. In 
addition to these direct, immediate human-interactive problems are long-term environmental 
changes and episodic natural and man-caused disasters.  Prolonged drought, tsunamis, 
earthquakes, oil spills, and epidemics and pandemics on national, regional, and cross-regional 
levels are examples of these types of problems.  
 
Whether man-made, led, influenced or natural, these problems severely stress the social fabric of 
human interaction and are catalysts to instability that must be mitigated or resolved.    Navies, 
Coast Guards, maritime organizations, and the broader community of stakeholders that interact 
directly with the sea form the solutions to these catalysts in the maritime domain.  The purpose 
of the GMPG was to identify the catalysts to instability at the national, regional and cross-
regional levels as well as the impediments to forming effective regional and global partnerships 
in the maritime domain from both U.S. and international perspectives. For the purposes of this 
game, catalyst to instability is defined as anything that initiates, accelerates, or causes an event or 
series of events to adversely impact the safety, security, economy, or environment of a nation, 
region, or super-region. 
 
Understanding these impediments is important to U.S. Navy Title X (organize, train, equip) 
responsibilities because these catalysts to instability, including, but not limited to, resource 
scarcity, epidemics and pandemics, and regional and transnational criminality, foster broad 
challenges to U.S. national security policy.  The U.S. Navy plays a critical role in confronting 
such challenges through forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection and 
humanitarian assistance and disaster response.  However, as identified in the Global ‗08 Title X 
game, such efforts cannot be sustained without effective international engagement and 
cooperative partnerships in maritime security (i.e., Maritime Domain Awareness). 
 
III. Game Objectives 
The Global Maritime Partnerships Game was designed to qualitatively and descriptively
v
 
explore the following five specific objectives: 
 Identify national, regional and cross-regional catalysts to instability (e.g., resource 
scarcity, epidemics and pandemics, and regional and transnational criminality) from both 
international and U.S. perspectives 
 Discern what relationships, if any, exist between these catalysts and the maritime domain 
 Identify broad-based partnership requirements  (e.g., policy, legal, technological, etc.) 






 Provide an environment for participants to explore and appreciate the complexities of 
establishing and maintaining effective maritime partnerships through domestic and 
international perspectives 
 Provide participants with an opportunity to familiarize themselves with a sampling of 
current technological research and innovations in Maritime Domain Awareness 
This year‘s event built on the Global ‘08 and other NWC games, academic research, and the 
International Seapower Symposium XIX hosted in October 2009 at the U.S. Naval War College 
in Newport, Rhode Island.  
By applying an inductive
vi
 game design and corresponding phenomenological analytic 
framework, the Naval War College War Gaming Department was able to the identify catalysts to 
instability at the national, regional and cross-regional levels as well as the impediments to 
forming effective regional and global partnerships in the maritime domain. This game also 
employed data visualization in order to summarize and conceptualize those catalysts, 
impediments and proposed solutions at the national, regional and cross-regional levels.  
IV.  Research Questions 
In order to address the mutually agreed upon objectives established by OPNAV N2/N6 and the 
Naval War College, the following overarching research question was proffered in this game: 
 Based on the catalysts to instability derived from the international participants, what are 
the impediments to forming effective regional and global partnerships in the maritime 
domain? 
At a more structured level, this game sought to inductively examine the following research 
questions: 
 What do the international participants in this game consider to be the present-day 
catalysts to instability in their respective region of the world? 
 What do the U.S. participants in this game consider to be the present-day catalysts to 
instability? 
 What is the relationship of these regional catalysts to the maritime domain?  
 What do the international participants consider to be the present-day catalysts to 
instability on a global scale?  
 What is the relationship of these international catalysts to the maritime domain? 
 Based on the regional catalysts to instability provided by the participants in this game, 
what are the impediments to building effective regional maritime partnerships? 
 Based on the cross-regional catalysts to instability provided by the participants in this 






The independent variable in this game was the impediments to forming partnerships at the 
regional and cross-regional levels, while the primary dependent variable was the cell‘s ability to 
mitigate these catalysts based upon regional and cross-regional partnerships in the maritime 
environment. In order to focus each cell at the high-operational-to-low-strategic level, specific 
capabilities were aggregated to the greatest extent possible.  
The GMPG strove to answer these questions through direct observation (i.e., ethnographic data 
capture), facilitator-guided sessions within each of the seminar player cells and direct 
observation of large group plenary sessions. Because these recorded observations, discussions, 
and plenary sessions were ―scrutinized…in search of patterns that the data reflect,‖ the 
overarching data collection process is inductive
vii
.  Analysis of the overarching research question 
is also considered descriptive because it ―revealed the nature of certain situations, settings, 
processes, relationships… [and] systems…‖
viii
   Importantly, there is no predictive value inherent 
in this data, because this game, like most, lacks sufficient reliability and consistency as a 
research instrument.  Unlike experiments and other types of empirical social research, games are 
rarely repeated to create a statistically valid sample using the same general population.
ix
  




IV. Game Design as a Catalyst for Inductively-Generated Knowledgexi 
This game was designed to enhance players‘ understanding of the catalysts to instability and the 
impediments to fostering national, regional and cross-regional partnerships in the maritime 
environment, as well as to inductively generate knowledge that can form the basis for future 
deductive hypothesis testing. To foster a setting favorable to phenomenological research, a one 
sided, seminar style game was developed in which up to 15 independent international player 
cells and one U.S. government cell employed strategies focused on mitigating the greatest 
regional and cross-regional catalysts to instability identified within individual game cells.  
The international game seminar cells consisted of approximately 10-12 players per cell, ideally, 
with one or two representatives from each regional nation that attended, based on the focus of the 
cell. Each cell was staffed with a Naval War College facilitator, technographers, and 
ethnographer (DCAP Section XI provides for a more complete description of each position‘s 
responsibility). Two U.S. players took part in the international cells. A separate U.S. 
Government cell was comprised of 34 players representing various entities including the Navy, 
Department of Defense, Department of State, non-governmental organizations, and academic 
institutions. This cell focused on addressing regional partnerships from a U.S. Navy/U.S. 
Government-oriented perspective, while the international cells explored these same issues 
through collective consensus built from the point of view of a cooperative regional or 
international entity through the lenses of each stakeholder as represented in the process. The 
international and U.S. cells strove to build partnerships to address complex problems. In order to 
do so, all cells engaged in the following activities: 






 Identify the major impediments to forming partnerships at the regional and cross-
regional levels  
 Propose collaborative solutions to forming partnerships at the regional and cross-
regional levels 
 Identify existing partnerships at the regional and cross-regional level and ways to 
improve the activities and actions employed by nations to address these issues 
The week was divided into three broad phases.  In the first phase the players focused on the 
current state of the maritime environment, both issues and implemented solutions.  In the second 
phase players built from the current set of maritime partnerships, information sharing regimes 
and MDA to develop better solutions to maritime problems and near-term recommendations for 
solution implementation.  Immediately following the conclusion of the game, players had the 
opportunity in the third phase to attend an MDA technology symposium.   
Phase 1 began on Sunday for the international players.  Players were welcomed at a 
luncheon and received overview briefings about the week ahead.  Following the 
briefings, players were grouped into their prospective game cells with moderators to 
conduct initial introductions and complete initial individual baseline surveys.  
Additionally, the moderator introduced the expected focus issue for initial cell work in 
Phase 2 and determined if all players had an affinity for participation.  Phase 1 continued 
on Monday with regionally focused briefings on current implementations of maritime 
partnerships, information sharing regimes and MDA presented by current regional 
participants in those activities.  
Phase 2 consisted of small cell seminar work by the player teams and large group plenary 
panel presentations to present cell results to all participants.  On Tuesday, Wednesday 
and Thursday, seminars were led by an NWC moderator and assisted by an NWC 
facilitator to produce briefing products using standardized templates for plenary panel 
discussions.  The plenary presentation product constituted the primary analytical output 
for the cell.  At the conclusion of the seminar session, players took individual web-based 
surveys covering their seminar‘s work.   
Phase 2 plenary panel discussions were included to enable broad sharing of the work 
done in individual seminars.  Game Control focused plenary panel sessions on specific 
areas of interest from across the player cells.  These sessions not only enabled broad 
dissemination of the recommendations from the seminars, but also enabled constructive 
criticism and inclusion of additional ideas from the broader audience.  The Friday 
morning plenary panel was attended by VADM Dorsett, USN, OPNAV N2/N6, and he 
made concluding remarks at the end of the game to wrap-up the event and provide thanks 
to the players for their work. Player out briefs are available in Appendix E. 
Phase 3 introduced various MDA technologies to the participants on Friday afternoon.  In 






participants.  Additionally, some technology solutions were presented in smaller room 
settings.  The technologies presented and the detailed descriptions of the overall game 
design are found in Appendix F and Appendix G. 
The U.S. cell players, separate from all U.S. and international players in the international player 
cells, broadly employed the technique of ‗active listening‘ to deeply understand the international 
players and the perspectives they brought to the game.  This understanding was developed 
through Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the game.  In support of the slightly different focus that the U.S. 
cell had from the international cells, game activities were tailored for this cell:   
Phase 1 began on Sunday for the U.S. cell players.  Players were welcomed at a luncheon 
and received overview briefings about the week ahead.  Following the briefings, players 
were grouped into their prospective game cells with moderators to conduct initial 
introductions and complete initial individual baseline surveys.  Additionally, the 
moderator introduced the cell focus and processes for Phase 2.  Phase 1 continued on 
Monday with all players, from both U.S. and international cells, receiving regionally 
focused briefings on current implementations of maritime partnerships, information 
sharing regimes and MDA presented by current regional participants in those activities.  
Phase 2 consisted of small cell seminar work by the player teams and large group plenary 
panel presentations to present cell results to all participants.  On Tuesday, Wednesday 
and Thursday, the U.S. cell was divided into sub-groups for some of its work processes 
based on player regional expertise.  On Tuesday, led by NWC moderators and assisted by 
facilitators, sub-groups evaluated the international cells‘ regional foci and considered the 
expected themes, trends and issues that might emerge across the regions, as well as the 
expected implications for the U.S. Government, broadly.  At the conclusion of the 
seminar session, players took individual web-based surveys covering their seminar‘s 
work.  During the Tuesday moderated plenary panel discussion, the U.S. Cell participated 
as audience members only.    
Phase 2 continued on Wednesday and Thursday for the U.S. cell.  On both days, players 
examined the products produced by the regional international cells, using their cultural 
expertise and other expert knowledge.  U.S. players ‗listened for meaning‘, actively 
understanding, interpreting and evaluating what they had observed/reviewed.  
Additionally, the U.S. cell produced a briefing on Thursday summarizing the perspectives 
of the international seminars.  During the Wednesday and Thursday moderated plenary 
panel discussions, the U.S. cell participated as audience members only.    
Phase 2 concluded on Friday morning with moderated plenary panel discussions.  The 
U.S. cell began the first Friday plenary session by briefing their understanding of the 
perspectives and recommendations from the international player cells.  Following the 
U.S. cell presentation, each of the international cells presented their recommendations for 






Phase 3 for the U.S. cell was conducted on Friday afternoon.  Using WebIQ groupware 
software, NWC moderators led the U.S. participants through a session to consider the 
broad implications of the proposed way ahead to the U.S. Government (broadly), 
maritime services (USN/USMC/USCG specifically), and U.S. Navy (Title X 
responsibilities to organize, train and equip).  Upon the completion of the moderated 
session, U.S. participants participated in the technology symposium.    
During the analytical process, the DCAT conducted analysis of each game cell‘s output in series 
from Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the game.  By employing this serial approach as opposed to an 
aggregated approach, analysts had the opportunity to explore the overarching research questions 
with more consistency through triangulation of findings than if all the data was analyzed in 
aggregate.  Incorporating triangulation into the overall analytical approach yielded a more robust 
final product than what would have resulted from a more rudimentary aggregated game.
xii
  
DCAT members were assigned as required to best capture player input during the game.  A 
minimum of four ethnographers and three technographers were assigned to the U.S. cell during 
the week.  During the auditorium plenary sessions, ethnographers were assigned to capture 
player comments and insights.  For the U.S. Cell Friday afternoon session, one DCAT member 
was posted at the front of the room to support the facilitator with a real time analysis feed from 
the control room of the Decision Support Center, where additional DCAT members were 
identifying common themes and providing a feedback channel to the moderator of content 
provided into WebIQ.   
 
V. Cell Deliverables 
For each game day, players in each of the international cells and the U.S cell developed the 
following three core products: 
 Links & Nodes Chart.  Captured via i2 Analyst Notebook software. 
 Microsoft PowerPoint slides (template provided) describing the catalysts to instability, 
impediments and solutions. Although players will directly contribute to the final 
template, its production will be facilitated by a technographer in each cell, thus allowing 
the players to stay engaged in seminar discussion rather than stepping out-of-role to 
complete a template. The U.S. cell will develop a separate template for each region and 
one brief that will discuss the common themes that emerged amongst all regions.  
 Individual Player Surveys.  All players assigned to the international cells and the U.S. 
cell will complete these surveys three times (i.e., once after each cell seminar).  Surveys 
will include open-ended and fixed choice questions.  See Appendix H, Annex 1 for 
survey details.   
 






Prior to game execution, each international and U.S. cell participant completed a background 
survey comprised of questions designed to ―gather data about the subject‘s background and 
experience.‖
xiii
 This survey assisted the Control Cell in identification of the international 
participant‘s regional and cross-regional catalysts to instability in order to assign them to their 
respective regional, issue-based cells.  This survey also afforded players the opportunity to 
familiarize themselves with the survey web-based software application prior to conducting their 
first seminar session the next day.  Survey questions featured a variety of open-ended questions 
(see Annex 1 to Appendix H for additional information): 
 
GAME OVERVIEW: 
Today‘s world presents many opportunities and challenges for humankind. Globalization has led to more 
robust access to raw materials, human capital resources, and established and emerging markets. However, 
this has also yielded unintended consequences by emphasizing inequities between nations in terms of 
their assets and capabilities. Perhaps nowhere has this disparity been more profound than in the maritime 
domain. While maritime theft, piracy, illegal fishing, and pollution are examples of overt acts occurring in 
the littorals, broader, more complex issues such as human smuggling, illicit drug trafficking, and gun 
running are also connected to the seascape. Such issues are not linked exclusively to the socioeconomic 
impacts of globalization; but rather, are also associated with climate change and natural and human 
caused disasters such as prolonged drought, tsunamis, earthquakes, oil spills, and epidemics and 
pandemics  on national, regional, and cross-regional levels. 
The purpose of the 2010 Global Maritime Partnerships Game (GMPG) is to identify catalysts to 
instability from national, regional and cross-regional perspectives in order to form effective regional and 
global partnerships in the maritime domain.   
Definition:  Catalyst to Instability:  Defined as anything that initiates, accelerates, or causes an event or 
series of events to adversely impact the safety, security, economy, or environment of a nation, region, or 
super-region. The following catalysts to instability were provided to the players. 
1) State Actor 
2) WMD Proliferation 
3) Piracy 
4) Environmental Group(s) 
5) Environmental Crimes 
6) Environmental Disasters 
7) Narcotics Trafficking 
8) Illegal Fishing 
9) Terrorism 
10) Weapons Trafficking 






12) Oil Smuggling 
13) Human Trafficking 
14) Illegal Immigration 
15) Competition for Natural Resources (e.g., Diamonds, etc) 
16) Competition for Energy Resources (e.g., Oil, Gas, etc) 
17) Territorial Dispute (e.g., EEZ, TTW and Borders) 
18) Government Corruption 
19) Threats to Critical Infrastructure 
20) White Collar Crime (money Laundering, fraud, etc.) 
21) Other: ________________________________ 
 
REGIONAL 
1) For your specific geographic region, which of the threats listed below do you consider to be the 
greatest catalyst to instability that has regional maritime security implications? 
2) For the catalyst identified in Question #1, describe how it affects the maritime security environment for 
your specific geographic region? 
 
CROSS-REGIONAL 
3) Thinking beyond your region, which of the threats listed below do you consider to be your greatest 
catalyst to instability that has cross-regional maritime security implications?  
4) For the catalyst identified in Question #3, describe how it affects the maritime security environment for 
your specific geographic region? 
Surveys will also be conducted in both the international cells and the U.S. cell at the conclusion 
of each seminar within the game (i.e., three times over three days). Much of the emphasis of 
these surveys will be placed upon gathering players‘ ―perceptions of the systems and processes 
they are employing, their knowledge of and attitudes towards…subjects…perceptions and 
insights…and their ideas about how…systems and work processes might be improved
xiv
.‖  The 
three surveys developed and administered to the players gather individual player perspectives on 
impediments, regional, and cross-partnerships. These survey questions feature a variety of open-
ended questions, including the following: 
1) From the list below, please select the regional maritime issue discussed in your cell. 
2) From the list below, please select the regional maritime issue or issues of concern 






3) What other impediments at the regional level, should your cell have taken into 
consideration, but were not adequately addressed?   
4) What other solutions at the regional level should your cell have taken into consideration, but 
were not adequately addressed? 
5)  Identify other countries (that your group discounted or overlooked) in your region that you 
would recommend partnering with to develop a collaborative solution? Please discuss the 
reasons for these partnerships?   
All of the questions included in the baseline and post-move surveys were pre-tested (along with 
assessing overall instrument efficacy) during the Alpha and Beta tests with a ―small sample of 
individuals from the population [being studied]…or one very similar to it.‖
xv
 Great care was 
placed to ensure survey questions did not presuppose a desired outcome on the part of the 
researchers or ―skew the agenda…‖
xvi
 Moreover, post-move survey questions focus on what 
players will do in the game (and, more importantly, why), as opposed to relying heavily on their 




VII. Data Collection Protocol 
The DCAP for the Global Maritime Partnerships 2010 game ensured six specific areas were 
considered for post-game analysis. These are as follows: 
 Identify regional and cross-regional catalysts to instability (e.g., resource scarcity, 
epidemics and pandemics, and regional and transnational criminality) that have maritime 
security implications from both international and U.S. perspectives. 
 Based on the regional and cross-regional catalysts to instability provided by the 
participants in this game, what are the impediments to building effective regional and 
cross-regional maritime partnerships? 
 Based on the regional and cross-regional impediments provided by the participants in this 
game, what are the international community‘s solutions to building effective regional and 
cross-regional levels maritime partnerships? 
 Identify broad-based partnership requirements (e.g., policy, legal, technological, etc.) that 
will enable Maritime Domain Awareness in order to counter the catalysts to instability 
identified in each move during the game. 
  What regional and cross-regional partnerships currently exist that enable Maritime 
Domain Awareness in order to counter catalysts to instability?  
 Based upon the international community‘s perceptions of the catalyst to instability and 
regional partnerships, what are the implications to the United Sates government, 






The DCAP identified thirteen data streams, twelve of which were collected during the game. All 
DCAT members involved in these collection efforts received instruction in proper data capture 
techniques during a pre-game bootstrap session, held on 03 October 2010 at 1100 hours. 
The datasets that were analyzed in this game are considered descriptive because they ―reveal the 
nature of certain situations, settings, processes, relationships…[and] systems…‖
xviii
 Because they 
are descriptive, the focus of the DCAT prior to compiling and writing the game report is to 
aggregate and ―assess the data and clarify the information that has been gathered‖
xix
 . 
 DCAT members are also responsible for ensuring quality assurance/quality control of the 
datasets submitted by the international cells and the U.S. cell during game play. Specifically, 
DCAT members ensured the following parameters were implemented for the nine data streams 
that were used for post-game analysis, and development of the final game report: 
 Formatting and standardization: Move templates submitted to the Control cell must 
adhere to the structure provided by the control team. Should any issues with any of 
the player cell‘s inputs be identified during the game, the DCAT will immediately 
report their concerns to the Control cell for possible corrective action. It is the 
responsibility of the technographers in each cell to ensure that templates are properly 
populated and saved. 
 Internal validity: Collection instruments must be designed correctly to ensure that 
accurate conclusions can be drawn from the data. To ensure their proper use during 
game play, specific internal validity issues with these instruments and the information 
they are designed to collect were identified during the Alpha and Beta tests, and have 
been corrected prior to the start of player move number one, which will occur in the 
morning session on 03 October 2010. 
 External validity: Due to the inherent challenges posed by ensuring consistent, 
accurate measurement in games
xx
, criterion validity is used to ―see if the results from 
an item or set of measures (a scale) are similar to some external standards or 
criteria.‖
xxi
 External validity applies predominately to the survey questions that will 
be asked in the individual international cells and U.S. cell player surveys that will be 
captured.  In order to ―provide…quality controls on data collection‖
xxii
 these 
questions were evaluated by an internal focus group as part of the Alpha and Beta 
testing process, prior to being deployed in the game. 
 
VIII. Analytic Methodology 
Current thinking in the field of social research suggests that a variety of analytic tools should be 
employed in behaviorally based activities such as war games, thus maximizing the credibility of 
the work
xxiii
. One widely accepted methodology that takes advantage of multiple techniques is 
―triangulation.
xxiv
 This approach allows us to derive the same or very similar conclusions using 
different datasets or methods.
xxv






―distinguish between the idiosyncratic…and the representative.‖
xxvi
 This method also allows the 
researcher to ―…base inquiry in the assumptions being used…[and] evaluat[e] questions…with 
the appropriate methodology rather than the methodology driving the evaluation.‖
xxvii
 Consistent 
with this approach, the eight data streams collected during this game will incorporate a variety of 
research procedures into analysis. A brief description of each analytic tool follows. This 
information is also summarized in the table found on the next page. The overarching 
triangulation approach is also depicted in the figure found in Section X of the DCAP.  
 Content Analysis: Described as ―a…method whereby a researcher seeks objectively to 
describe the content of communication messages that people have previously 
produced‖
xxviii
. ―Content analysis involves identifying coherent and important 
examples…and patterns in the data… [and subdividing]…data into coherent categories, 
patterns, and themes.‖
xxix
 For the purposes of this game, content will be ―binned‖ to 
determine which, if any, of the six focus areas presented in part VIII of this DCAP are 
supported by player actions, comments, or White cell assessment.  
 Grounded Theory: A more detailed, methodologically sound approach to analysis than 
the initial step of content analysis, grounded theory employs systematic, hierarchical 
procedures to develop inductively derived theory grounded in data. Grounded theory 
―directs researchers to look for patterns in data so that they can make general statements 
about the phenomena they examined‖
xxx
. For the purposes of this game‘s analysis, the 
DCAT will be using ―an inductive, theory discovery methodology that allows the 
researcher to develop a theoretical account of the general features of a topic while 
simultaneously grounding the account in empirical observations or data‖
xxxi
 
 Data Visualization: By comparing and contrasting the players‘ activities in the areas of 
maritime security, stability operations, and building partnerships within the context of 
capabilities, benefits, and intended consequences, overlapping Venn diagrams can be 
produced that will allow the DCAT to identify gaps, seams, and overlaps in U.S. Navy 
actions supporting other nations and organizations.
 xxxii




 Inherent Value of Data Primary Analytic 
Technique 
Pre-Game Player Survey Background About Players Content Analysis 
 
Catalyst to Instability 
 
Player Cell Assignments Content Analysis 
Cell Links & Nodes Chart using i2 
Analyst Notebook  

















Cell Briefing Template via PowerPoint 
 
What Players did in Game Content Analysis 
 
Environmental Notes during Cell 
Discussions via Excel Spreadsheet 
Why Players did in Game Grounded Theory 
Environmental Notes during Group 
Plenary Discussions 
Why Players did in Game Grounded Theory 
Post-Move Cell Player Surveys via In-
Relief 
Why Players did in Game Grounded Theory 
White Cell Assessment/Environmental 
Notes 
What Players did in Game Content Analysis 










Player thoughts via WebIQ (U.S. Cell 
Only) 
 
Why Players did in Game Content Analysis 
Cell Final Session Outbrief (Player 
derived) 
What & Why Players did 
Game/ Policy Implications 
Content Analysis 
Cell Links & Nodes Chart using i2 Text 

















































IX. Data Collection and Analysis Team Roles 
Members of the Data Collection and Analysis Team (DCAT) were assigned to specific roles 
based upon their experience, education, and interests.  The five specific functions assigned to the 
DCAT are as follows: 
DCAT Team Leader/Assistant Team Leader: Serves as Incident Commander and Assistant 
Incident Commander, respectively and is responsible for all aspects of data management, 
collection, analysis, and report writing. Any issues involving collection strategies, information 
technology challenges, concerns with methodologies or analytic procedures, or DCAT personnel 
should be brought to the attention of the Team Leader/Assistant Team Leader. 
Collection Leader: Responsible for data management during the game as well as post-execution 
organization of files. Questions regarding file structure, data import/export, and information 
release should be referred to the Collection Leader.       
Report Leader/Assistant Report Leader: Primary author for the Game Report, responsible for 
organizing, writing, and editing much of its four primary areas (i.e., Introduction, Game Design 
& Research Methodology, Analysis & Results, and Conclusions/Recommendations for Further 
Study). Tasks other members of the DCAT with preparation of report sections and ensures 
compliance with requisite deadlines.    
Technographers(s)/Real-Time Analyst(s): Populates links and nodes charts based on participant 
discussions and ensures that data are properly saved on the Unclassified GAMENET for 
subsequent analysis. Performs on-going analysis through the course of game play including 
review of incoming data streams for common themes and ideas, content analysis, grounded 
theory, and data visualization. Reports emerging patterns throughout the course of game play to 
DCAT Team Leader for use by Game Director, Designer, and Plenary Panel Moderators. At the 
conclusion of the game, develops links and nodes charts, cell PowerPoint slides/Word 
Documents, and serves as primary author(s) of the data visualization portion of the Game Report. 
He supports the Ethnographer in collecting player comments through environmental recording.  
Ethnographer (Environmental Recorder(s)): Employs a variety of ethnographic techniques to 
capture player insights and White cell/subject matter expert ideas during the game play. He 
records observations in Microsoft Word and Excel for use by Real-Time Analyst(s) both during 
and after game play.  
Additional information and training regarding specific DCAT members‘ roles was provided 






spreadsheet was provided.   The entire NWC WGD GMPG team participated in Control Cell 
meetings daily during the game at the end of the player game day. 
 
X. Summary of Products, Draft Game Report Outline, and Schedule for Deliverables 
In order to ensure that data are collected to support the stated objectives, specific products were 
developed subsequent to game analysis, all of which are unclassified. These are as follows: 
 Global Maritime Partnerships 2010 Post-Game Game Executive Summary  
 Executive PowerPoint Brief  
 Game Report 
 Game Information Summary Sheet 
The game report will be comprised of six major sections, plus a table of contents. The six main 
sections are as follows: 




c. Purpose  of GMPG 
d.  GMPG Objectives 
e.  Research questions  
3. GAME DESIGN  
a. Game Design Introduction 
b. Game Design 
c. Analytical Framing 
d.  Collection Approach 
e. Identification of Independent and Dependent Variables 
f.  Definition of Key Terms 
4. ANALYSIS & RESULTS 
a. Themes, Observations and Insights 
b.  Title 10 Implications 






d. International Participant Demographics 
e. U.S. Participant Demographics 
5. WGD LESSONS LEARNED / RECOMMENDATIONS 
a.  Administration and Logistics 
b. Future Events 
c. Future Game – U.S. Centric 
d. Future Games – Regionally Centric 
6. Appendices 
a. Attendees 
b. Background Maritime Security Games 
c. Research/ Associated Events 
d. Schedule of Events 
e. Cell Outbriefs 
f. Technology Symposium  
g. Game Mechanics  
h. Data Collection and Analysis Plan (DCAP)  
i. Regional Cell Analysis 
j. Administration / Logistics 
k. Glossary 
 
 Specific remaining benchmarks for the Data Collection and Analysis Team are follows: 
 Alpha/Beta Tests for Global Maritime Partnerships 2010 Game……. ………23/24 Sep 2010 
 Survey Pre-Test/Questions Focus Group……………..………………….........27/28 Sep 2010 
 Data Collection Loop/Analytic Tools Test…………………….............................30 Sep 2010 
 Global Maritime Partnerships Game Execution………..…….………………  03/08 Oct 2010 
 Analysis/Game Report Preparation…………...…………………….....……11Oct/1 Dec 2010 
 Executive PowerPoint Brief Due……………..………….………………………..29 Oct 2010 








                                                          
i
 The use of different sources of data and varied analytical techniques for the same research question in order to 
determine to “verify the consistency of findings.” McMillan, J.H. & Wergin, J.F. (2010). Understanding and 
Evaluating Educational Research (Fourth Edition). (p. 12) . Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson  
ii
 ibid (p. 90) .  
iii
 Ibid (p. 90). 
iv
 Berg, B.L., (2007). Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences (Sixth Edition), pp. 172-174.  Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Pearson. 
v
 Because this game is exploring phenomena, its emphasis is on the player experiences, which will be detailed at 
length in predominately unstructured interviews and plenary sessions. Accordingly these data are descriptive 
because they discuss what the players did during the game and why they said they made specific actions; however, 
neither predictability nor inferentiality should be assumed. 
vi
Induction strives to connect seemingly unrelated or disparate events using pattern analysis in order to form a 
basis for developing hypotheses or conclusions (in Brightman, Today’s White Collar Crime (p. 354), Routledge, 
2009). 
vii
 Leedy, P.D, & Ormrod, J.E. (2005). Practical Research: Planning and Design (Eighth Edition) (p. 96). Pearson. 
viii
 ibid (p. 134).  
ix
 Dunnigan, J.F. (2000) Wargames Handbook, Third Edition (p. 325). 
x
 The ability of research based on a sample to be generalized to an overall population (in Salkind, N.J., (2004). 
Statistics for People Who Think They Hate Statistics (p. 104). Sage).  
xi
 See Patton, M.Q. (1997). Utilization-Focused Evaluation: The New Century Text (Third Edition), pp. 219-222. SAGE: 
Thousand Oaks, CA. 
xii
Dunnigan, J.F. (2000) Wargames Handbook, Third Edition (pp. 325-328) Writers Club Press. 
xiii
 Alberts, D.S. & Hayes, R.E. (Eds.) (2002). Code of Best Practice Experimentation. (p. 246). Command and Control 
Research Program.  
xiv
 Ibid, pp. 246-247. 
xv
 Bachman, R. & Schutt, R.K. (2003). The Practice of Research In Criminology and Criminal Justice (Second Edition). 
(p. 193). Sage.  
xvi
 Alberts, D.S. & Hayes, R.E. (Eds.) (2002). Code of Best Practice Experimentation. (p. 247). Command and Control 
Research Program 
xvii
 Empirical research has clearly shown that decision-makers frequently err, through their failure to “use 
established psychological theories and practices to guide them in their choices,” and “being overly reliant on their 
personal experiences…” Goldstein, N.J., Martin, S.J. & Cialdini (2008). Yes! 50 Scientifically Proven Ways to Be 






                                                                                                                                                                                           
xviii
 ibid (p. 134).  
xix
 Berg, B. L. (2007). Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences (Sixth Edition). (p. 228). Allyn & Bacon. 
xx
 Gilad, B. (2009). Business War Games (Chap. 2). Career Press. 
xxi
 Nardi, P.M. (2003). Doing Survey Research (p. 50). Allyn & Bacon. 
xxii
 Patton, M.Q. (1987). How to Use Qualitative Methods in Evaluation (p. 135). Sage 
xxiii
 Myers, M.D. (Ed.) (1999). Qualitative Research in Information Systems in Martin, P.Y. and B.A. Turner. 
"Grounded Theory and Organizational Research," The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, (22:2), 1986, pp. 141-
157. 
xxiv
 Williams, F., Rice, R.E. & Rogers, E. M. (1988). Research Methods and the New Media. (pp. 13-14). The Free 
Press.  
xxv
 Leedy, P.D, & Ormrod, J.E. (2005). Practical Research: Planning and Design (Eighth Edition) (p. 99). Pearson. 
xxvi
 Potter, W.J. (1996). An Analysis of Thinking and Research About Qualitative Methods. (pp. 154-155). Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Publishers. 
xxvii
 Brown, M.J. (1992). Issues in Educational Reform: How Triangulating Qualitative and Quantitative Evaluation 
Methods Can Enhance Understanding. (p. 25). University of Georgia.    
xxviii
 Levin, J. & Fox, J.A. (1991). Elementary Statistics in Social Research. (p. 6). HarperCollins. 
xxix
 Patton, M.Q. (1987) How to Use Qualitative Methods in Evaluation (p. 149).Sage. 
xxx
 Potter, W.J. (1996). An Analysis of Thinking and Research About Qualitative Methods. (p. 151).  
xxxi
 Myers, M.D. (Ed.) (1999). Qualitative Research in Information Systems in Martin, P.Y. and B.A. Turner. 
"Grounded Theory and Organizational Research 
xxxii
 Westphal C. & Blaxton, T. (1998). Data Mining Solutions: Methods and tools for Solving Real-World Problems. 
Wiley. 
xxxiii















                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Appendix I – Regional Cell Analysis 
1.1. Observations, Insights, & Player Recommendations 
This section is an aggregated synopsis of all the cell products and individual player 
surveys collected during the game.  Specifically, cell presentations, link and node charts, 
ethnography notes, and individual post-move survey results were aggregated, analyzed 
and presented according to the geographic groupings and individual player and country 
assertions made during the game.  Each of the cells identified the following observations, 
insights and recommendations to forming maritime partnerships in order to effectively 
address the stressors and demands encountered in the maritime environment. 
1.2. Discussion: The 83 players from 46 countries identified the following impediments and 
proposed solutions in individual player surveys, discussions and game play. 
Sub Region: Mediterranean Sea 
Countries: France, Morocco, Lebanon, Israel, Italy, Spain, Turkey, Egypt 
Catalyst to Instability: Drug trafficking, illegal immigration, critical infrastructure 
protection, piracy, energy competition, resources and associated sea lanes, EEZ and 
border issues, weapons trafficking and Illegal fishing 
Observations 
 Players identified that in order to improve and build partnerships, a commonly 
agreed upon definition and understanding of global maritime partnerships was 
required. Players also agreed that Global Maritime Partnerships serves as a 
collective effort among nations to reduce the realm of illegal activity and threats 
at sea in support of national goals. Furthermore, an agreed upon end state will 
allow nations to effectively generate a common approach.  
 Players agreed that the Mediterranean Sea was a relatively secure region with a 
lack of perceived threat. Based on this lack of perceived threat, an increase in 
level of effort yields insufficient return on investment. Players also noted that this 
lack of perceived threat influences public perception and competing national 
priorities.   
  Player identified a number of impediments to information sharing to include 
security classification, cultural, legal, interagency, technological, and 
coordination.  
Insights 
 Players derived that the diversity of data classification levels by each country 






                                                                                                                                                                                           
player noted that an attempt to declassify information in order to maintain 
confidentiality of sources will allow for an increase in information sharing and 
build trust. The players attributed this assertion primarily to the diverse definitions 
of information and intelligence and national strategies to achieving efficacy in 
MDA.          
 Players cited that national authorities and major legal issues restricted countries 
from sharing. Specifically the legal and diplomatic issues were due to significant 
resistance from North African countries to initiate agreements with the European 
Union.  
 Players derived that technical barriers to information sharing are the easiest to 
address. Some players noted that a single national point such as the UK‘s NMIC 
or Italy‘s SIEMS were ideal models for sharing information regionally. 
 Players briefly discussed a multilateral maritime partnership or coalition aimed at 
promoting stability and prosperity throughout the region. One proposal was to 
leverage the existing Union for the Mediterranean. However, players noted that 
this partnership has yet to prosper due to a lack of leadership, robust threat and 
coordination among neighboring countries.  
Player Recommendations 
 Players noted that information sharing and partnership building would best be 
achieved through a multi-layered regional approach through agreements, either 
bilaterally or through coalitions.  
 Players suggested continuing the initiation and improvement of regional 
partnerships through military engagement which could evolve into more robust 
diplomatic relationships. Diplomatic relations were noted as an essential 
component to enduring long term solutions in the region. 
 Players collectively postulated the need to continue efforts to federate regional 
and trans-regional networks (i.e., VRMTC and TRMN).  
 The use of existing venues (RSS, VRMTC-TRMN Annual Meeting, 5 + 5 
exercise, EU/Non-EU forums & CHEN) was noted as an essential next step to 
advancing regional partnership efforts. 
 Players collectively agreed that regional standardization for classification levels 
was an essential element of sharing information.  
 The establishment of partnerships both with Mediterranean countries not currently 
involved, and other countries of interest was noted as an important next 






                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Sub Region: Pacific Ocean 
Countries: Japan, Australia, Singapore, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia 
Catalyst to Instability: Maritime Terrorism and Piracy threats to Sea Lines of 
Communication  
Observations 
 Players noted trust as an enduring problem within the Asia/Pacific region 
requiring constant attention and management at the highest level of government.  
Furthermore, it was highlighted that while most of the solutions are long term, 
continuing naval engagement can mitigate certain short term impediments.  
 Many nations in the region have suspicions regarding certain initiatives and 
motives for engagement and some of these initiatives are seen as an attempt at 
external influence on domestic issues. Additionally, players noted that some view 
MDA as a disguise to track vessels and people.  
 Territorial Sovereignty issues were recognized by the players as enduring 
problems requiring constant attention and management. Players noted that 
periodic disagreements and disputes among nations lead to breakdowns in 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the region.  
 Players noted various capacity and capability challenges as enduring issues that 
requires constant changes in technology.   
 Players derived that there were many impediments encountered to sharing data, 
unclassified and classified, at the sub-regional, regional and cross-regional levels.   
Insights 
 Players derived that territorial disputes are a major issue in the region. This was 
discussed mainly because there is not a universal ratification of UNCLOS 
combined with the fact that portions of it (UNCLOS) are outdated.  This is 
holding back countries from fully integrating into partnerships and information 
sharing arrangements. Additionally, a poor understanding of UNCLOS and 
different interpretations on jurisdiction leads to questions of responsibility and 
authorities. Specifically, some players noted concern over China‘s influence in the 
region, while others noted they would adopt a ―standby‖ position until they get a 
better feel for their role in the region. A few disputed territories noted by the 
players include: Korean Peninsula (DPRK vs. ROK), Dokdo Island (ROK vs. 
Japan), South China Sea & Spratly Islands (PRC, Taiwan, Philippines, Vietnam, 
Malaysia, etc.), East China Sea & Senkaku Islands (PRC vs. Japan), Indonesia 






                                                                                                                                                                                           
 While there are a number of information sharing structures in place in the Asia 
Pacific region, there remains room for other initiatives to supplement and 
augment, specifically in South China Sea and South Pacific. The South Pacific 
was described as ―a Black hole, unmonitored and ripe for exploitation by folks 
with nefarious intentions.‖ 
 Players cited that the Asia/Pacific region as a large geographic region with a great 
degree of variability in capabilities and capacities of nations located within the 
region.  This lack of capacity and capability in some sub-regions leads to 
challenges in developing partnerships and information sharing relationships. 
These capacity shortfalls include: Coastal surveillance capabilities, information 
fusion software, radar, C4I, thermal sensing, ships and aircraft, training and AIS 
receiving sites. 
 Sharing of information across classified and unclassified domains and between 
military, interagency, commercial entities remains a problem within the Asia 
Pacific region because of a variety of reasons including trust and confidence, 
territorial sovereignty, and capacity and capability.  Specific MDA-like 
impediments include: national/policy/legal restrictions, technical/equipment 
compatibility, commercial/economic sensitivities, and privacy restrictions. 
Player Recommendations 
 Players suggested that in order to increase transparency and foster greater trust in 
the region, there should be an increase in personnel/ LNO exchange programs and 
sharing of doctrinal publications, best practices, and other maritime security 
documentation.   
 Players recommended that the U.S. should continue 1206 program. Specifically, 
the U.S. Navy should continue capacity building and funding to Philippines, 
Indonesia, and Thailand (support via bandwidth, strategic lift, and 
specialist/subject matter experts).  
 Regional leaders and U.S. should work with the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) to resolve territorial disputes. U.S. presence in region was 
highly desired by the players. Specifically, players noted that consistent U.S. 
presence in the region helps ―guarantee‖ freedom of navigation.  
 U.S. and other regional leaders work with commercial organizations to ensure 
they understand the relevance of sharing and what incentives are available.  
 U.S. and regional leaders should work with the IMO to standardize data and 
equipment protocols as well as encourage wider integration of International 
Shipping and Port Security (ISPS) requirements for international maritime 






                                                                                                                                                                                           
 Players suggested the development of an apparatus by USN and other regional 
leaders to synergize MDA & partnership efforts to coordinate, reduce duplication, 
and maximize benefit of resources allocated at the regional and cross-regional 
levels. 
 Build upon the model of IFC (Information Fusion Center) by creating an open 
space where everyone is included in participation and encourage the participation 
of more countries.  Players suggested leveraging or building upon existing models 
(ReCAAP, IFC, PRC, and ISPS), specifically in the South China Sea and the 
South Pacific.  
 Regional leaders and U.S should demonstrate the mutual benefit of MDA by 
employing tailored sub-regional focused conferences, workshops and seminars.  
Sub Region: Indian Ocean 
Countries: India, Kenya, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania 
Catalyst to Instability: Piracy 
Observations 
 Although geographically grouped around the Indian Ocean, cell members 
identified three sub-regions with unique issues: India and Pakistan – regional 
maritime security is overshadowed by strategic concerns; Oman and Saudi Arabia 
- Unable to secure their own maritime borders but satisfied with the status quo 
and strongly prefer to work through Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC); Kenya and 
Tanzania – Resource-poor and open to any types of assistance and/or partnership 
to increase capacity 
 Players cited the following themes as reasons that inhibit partnerships within the 
region: political will, lack of trust, competing national interest, lack of capacity 
and capability, unequal treatment of multinational partners, language and cultural 
barriers, and technology incompatibilities. 
Insights 
 Players suggested that the lack of trust in the region stems from unresolved bi-
lateral issues, negative or lack of any historical relationships, external intervention 
in internal affairs, hidden agendas, perceptional differences, and differing levels 
of commitment to the issue, lack of transparency, limited engagement 
opportunities, differing naval competencies, and double standards.  
 Players derived that lack of political will is often due to lack of interest, 
commitment and competing interests, which in turn results in ―half measures, 






                                                                                                                                                                                           
 Players postulated that enduring partnerships in the region should be of common 
interest, equal, and voluntary in nature. While no ―one size fits all solution‖ exists 
in this region, players were largely influenced by cell members‘ failure to 
perceive a community of interest between their nations.  Although geographically 
grouped around the Indian Ocean, cell members did not view their respective 
nations as regional partners and seemed less willing to enhance partnerships due 
to a lack of common interest or shared threat.  
 Players discussed intelligence sharing in the region as being primarily bilateral in 
nature; multilateral or unilateral sharing appeared somewhat problematic. 
Moreover, limitations to intelligence sharing stemmed from technology, 
classification, and fusion and analysis, as well as trust issues.  
 Due to the composition of this cell, it seemed that there were difficulties in 
identifying a common maritime security issue that unites these disparate nations. 
Kenya and Tanzania perceived piracy as a regional issue that has severely 
impacted their economies due to the reluctance of merchant ships to enter their 
waters. Other countries in the cell viewed piracy as a global issue, much like 
climate change or illegal fishing.   
Player Recommendations 
 Players preferred to leverage existing organizations such as the Indian Ocean 
Naval Symposium, Gulf Cooperation Council, United Nations, and African Union 
to enhance regional partnerships.  
 Players suggested the need to increase bilateral relations among nations and 
improve sharing between existing organizations (e.g., GCC, UN, AU, etc.) and 
maritime coalitions and commercial entities. 
 Promote maritime partnerships by improving regional relationships through 
strengthening regional forums, promoting information sharing, and building 
coalitions to tackle regional issues. 
 Players recommended that regional countries develop international protocols and 
agreements. 
 Aligning domestic legislation through ratification of international regulation was 
noted by the players as a necessary step to improving maritime security 
cooperation. 
 Enhance regional capability and capacity building by increasing the frequency of 






                                                                                                                                                                                           
technology sharing within the region, and strengthening regional institutions to 
enhance training opportunities. 
Sub Region: Baltic Sea 
Countries: Sweden, Poland, Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom 
Catalyst to Instability: Lack of Understanding/Geopolitical Balance of Power 
Observations 
 Throughout game play, players asserted that information and intelligence were 
not adequately shared nationally, regionally, or cross-regionally due to various 
impediments including over-classification of information, cultural differences and 
legal challenges. 
 Players derived that there was an incomplete understanding of how other 
countries and organizations both operate and approach maritime issues. This was 
noted as ―one of the major challenges faced in the region‖.  
 Players indicated significant improvements made in the region to enhance 
partnerships and Maritime Security Awareness.  However, players also identified 
the lack of a common legal interpretation and policy for conducting maritime 
security operations in the region.  
Insights 
 Players collaboratively cited that the region could improve upon information 
sharing by leveraging existing MDA/MSA systems.  The production of new 
systems and technology investments should be a low priority over non-
technological aspects of partnerships. Specifically, players agreed that it was 
essential to enhance funding in ―training, coalition conferences, seminars, and 
travel.‖ 
 Players conceded that maritime situational awareness was limited by the non-
participation of Russia in the international information sharing systems 
(SUCBAS, MARSUNO). SUCBAS was identified as a promising way forward 
for further regional integration due to user controls of inputs. While most states in 
the region regard SUCBAS as a MDA tool, the Swedes, in no uncertain terms, use 
it to contribute to national maritime defense. Players also noted that understanding 
the policies of Russia, China and North Korea regarding piracy, smuggling, and 
MDA was essential in striving towards a commonly understood global maritime 
picture.     
 The proposed global MDA solution was a combination of present regional 
MDA/MSA networks; moreover, leveraging existing systems is likely to be 






                                                                                                                                                                                           
 It was identified by the cell that there were no common regional policy 
interpretations (including legal aspects) for conducting maritime security 
operations. Specific aspects noted by the players included: ―Liabilities, 
Jurisdiction, and Prosecution‖, standards of evidence, standards of consequence 
(e.g., no standard for what to do with pirates apprehended at sea) and 
repercussions of environmental disasters which cross international maritime 
boundaries.  
Player Recommendations 
 Developing an information sharing policy for the Baltic region with tangible 
output for ISS XX (October 2011) was touted as one of the most actionable and 
short term recommendations made by the players.  
 The establishment of an unclassified information sharing system and portal for the 
Baltic region was noted as an essential ―next implementation step‖ in working 
towards better information sharing in the region.  
 In an effort to better understand the intentions and capabilities of both countries 
and organizations, players discussed the desire to expand ISS XX invitations to 
other countries, trade corporations, port authorities & international organizations.  
 With respect to specific partnership aspects between the U.S. Navy and regional 
navies and coast guards, participating countries recommended to continue and 
enhance confined shallow-water exercises (e.g., BALTOPS & NORTHERN 
COAST). 
 Players derived that the international community should increase their 
involvement in NATO Center‘s of Excellence (COE‘s) in support of regional and 
cross-regional partnership building. 
 Collectively, players touted the continuing development of common international 
legal standards, policies and procedures for information sharing, particularly the 
interactions between regional MDA systems (e.g., VRMTC, SUCBAS, MSSIS, 
OASIS). 
 Use existing national, regional and cross-regional models to develop international 
best practices and ―courses of instruction‖ for inter-agency cooperation and 
information sharing (e.g., NMIC, SUCBAS, VRMTC, and TRMN). 
Sub Region: Black Sea 
Countries: France, Morocco, Greece, Lebanon, Israel, Italy, Spain, Georgia, Bulgaria, 
Turkey, Azerbaijan, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine 






                                                                                                                                                                                           
Observations 
 The cell identified areas of improvement among interagency and international 
partners particularly in the area of information and intelligence sharing. Players 
noted that competing interpretations of intelligence classification levels presented 
significant challenges to sharing unclassified data.  
 Players derived that trust factors among interagency organizations, specifically 
within each of their countries represented during the game, were a common 
obstacle. Other restriction such as national polices, classification, cultural and 
technologies were identified as common impediments to sharing unclassified and 
classified data both nationally and internationally.  
 Players agreed that in order to contribute the full spectrum of data to a global 
MDA network, a common international framework or standard for information 
sharing is needed. One player noted that ―it is difficult to combine information 
sharing networks built to different standards without a commonly agreed upon set 
of technology standard(s).‖   
Insights 
 Most players during game play expressed the willingness and ability to share 
unclassified, AIS-like information with international partners.  However, the cell 
collectively identified the need to establish a common regional strategy or 
approach to sharing all types of data, particularly more sensitive operational data.  
It was evident that players‘ definition of information and intelligence and the 
sensitivities associated with each were drastically different, causing difficulties 
within the cell to focus the issue down to a common root cause.   
 Interagency issues were noted by the cell as one of the major impediments to 
sharing data both internally and externally. Specifically, players identified the 
need for a ―common global maritime picture through identical software that can 
link the Black Sea to the Mediterranean regions.‖ Specifically, one player noted, 
―many countries in the region are willing to share, but lack the requisite 
capabilities; and many of these countries still need to establish links to the U.S. 
CNO to request assets and support.‖ 
 Players acknowledged the need to expand Black Sea cooperation to other 
countries in the region. Specifically, players noted Azerbaijan as a country with 
which they would like to establish and enhance a maritime partnership. Several 
players identified the existence of regional centers within their own respective 







                                                                                                                                                                                           
Player Recommendations 
 Utilize the IMO to develop common information sharing framework, standards 
and procedures for black sea region. Specifically, players offered the 
establishment of a regional initiative, with the support of the IMO, aimed at 
developing common classification standards.   
 Establish regional information sharing exercises among nations in either the  
Black Sea Region or between the Black Sea and Mediterranean regions.   
 Players postulated that the GCC should expand information sharing links to 
VRMTC as well as establish specific links with the respective participating 
nations involved.  
 An increase in training, education and personnel in support of GCC coordination 
centers was noted as an essential solution to advancing partnership efforts in the 
region. 
 Collectively, players specifically noted that Azerbaijan should establish 
information sharing links to other countries in the Black Sea within the 
framework of the Black Sea Economic Forum. 
 Utilize existing regional operation and coordination centers and organizations to 
advance regional MDA initiatives (e.g., VRMTC, GCC, etc). 
Sub Region: Central & Western Africa 
Countries: Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Cameroon and Gabon 
Catalyst to Instability: Illegal Fisheries 
Observations 
 The overarching theme identified by each of the sub-regional African cells 
centered on a significant lack of general resources (e.g., operational assets, 
dedicated funding, and economic activity) within each of their respective 
countries.   
 Players derived that at the national, sub-regional and regional levels, ―Sea-
blindness‖ as defined by the players, was a considerable impediment to 
addressing the many demands and stressors encountered in the maritime 
environment. This sub theme discussed was touted as a major contributing factor 
and root cause to the general lack of resources.    
 Players generally agreed to the major demands and stressors encountered in the 
maritime environment at the sub-regional and regional levels. However, 






                                                                                                                                                                                           
mainly due to the game grouping of players within a seminar cell, which was 
developed primarily from a U.S. perspective.   
 Regional communication and coordination between sub-regional organizations 
(ECCAS and ECOWAS) were highly desired and discussed as essential next steps 
to establishing situational awareness in the region. Communication and 
coordination through development of regional protocols, policies and procedures 
for information sharing and maritime security operations.  
Insights 
 Players cited ―a lack of dedicated funding‖ at the national, sub-regional and 
regional levels, in support of the various operational assets needed to effectively 
detect, deter and defeat the maritime security issues of concern. The specific 
inadequate platforms and logistics discussed by the players include a Coastal 
Monitoring System along the Gulf of Guinea, patrol vessels, helicopters, and 
MDA systems at the national, sub-regional and regional levels, as well as spare 
parts, maintenance facilities and fuel.  
 In general, ―Sea blindness‖ was discussed as a major impediment to enhancing 
maritime security partnerships. As defined by these players, ―Sea blindness‖ is a 
lack of political focus and public awareness on maritime security and subsequent 
investment. There was a consensus among the players that the collective lack of 
recognition of maritime issues in the region is mainly due to ―political 
leadership‘s focus on land-based issues.‖ One player noted, ―Political leadership 
has no appreciation for the consequences (of) neglecting the maritime domain‖.  
 While players generally agreed to the variety of maritime issues encountered in 
the region, there were competing national prioritizations. However, illegal 
migration to other African sub-regions and Europe was noted as a major security 
problem due to ―the unsafe methods used and criminal elements that were 
involved in the business.‖ While the players did not identify their cell as an 
official sub-region, mainly due to its composition, player cohesiveness and 
willingness to work together was noted by the majority as a significant milestone 
in achieving peace and prosperity through the region.  
 The need to enhance effective communication between West Africa (ECOWAS) 
and East Africa (ECCAS) was noted throughout game play as an underlying 
requirement to enhancing partnerships in the region.  Specifically, players 
leveraged the use of existing sub-regional organizations (e.g., ECCAS, 
ECOWAS), coupled with the development of a ―higher level mechanism‖ (e.g., 
an operations center), to harmonize sub regional efforts. These organizations 






                                                                                                                                                                                           
authority to enhance MDA and broader maritime partnerships; ―but they do not 
have the will or awareness to take the next steps.‖ 
 In order to effectively form partnerships at the sub-regional and regional levels, 
players overwhelming desired ―common procedures (doctrine, communications, 
ROE), common legal penalties for criminal activity; and needed persistent 
surveillance capability for basic situational awareness, and sufficient economic 
incentives for population to deter maritime crime (and creating) an alternative 
means of survival.‖ 
Player Recommendations 
 Players derived that for the development of a Coastal Monitoring System along 
the Gulf of Guinea, training was needed, along with subsequent policies.  
International support was highly desired to facilitate the development of this 
initiative.   
 Create an overarching regional operations center over the ECOWAS & ECCAS 
operations centers and conduct regular exercises between these centers. Develop a 
grass-roots awareness campaign to educate political leadership on maritime 
security threats. 
 Develop a multilateral governing body or coalition focused on Maritime Security 
(cross-functional members, funding controls, policy setting, etc).  
 Develop a common regional information sharing methodology. 
 Invest in regional repair facilities/personnel/equipment, training and purchase 
operational platforms (to combat maritime pollution). 
Sub Region: Central & South America 
Countries: Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Panama, Guatemala, 
Colombia 
Catalyst to Instability: Drug Trafficking and Corruption 
Observations 
 Drug trafficking was identified as the major catalyst to instability or maritime 
security issue of concern within the Central and South American regional player 
cells. The lack of a unified regional strategy to detect, deter, disrupt, and 
prosecute narcotics traffickers in the maritime environment was viewed by all 
participants as an overarching theme throughout the game. 
 Generally, the common impediments identified across these cells included trust 






                                                                                                                                                                                           
corruption, and inadequate resources, funds and assets at the national, sub-
regional and regional levels.  
 Players concluded a common disconnect exists between political and military 
leadership, specifically within the context of competing national security 
strategies, defense funding, and prioritization and allocation of defense resources.    
Insights 
 Players derived that a more holistic approach should be taken in exploring drug 
trafficking, particularly the ―spill-over‖ or regional implications exacerbated by 
this phenomenon.  Specifically, players drew correlations between drug 
trafficking and weapons trafficking, money laundering, and government 
corruption. 
 Trust was viewed by the players as a long-term systemic barrier to cooperation 
both within and outside their respective countries. However, international naval 
cooperation at the unit and individual member level (e.g., liaisons) was identified 
as a significant ―foot in the door‖ and way to enhance or initiate partnerships 
across all levels of government. Long-term investment in cooperative events (e.g., 
conferences, exercises, games, etc) at the sub-regional and regional levels was 
deemed as a highly effective and desired way of enhancing trust and partnerships 
over time.  
 Players identified technical compatibility gaps among interagency and 
international partners related to diverse technical and classification standards and 
competing maritime operating pictures. Technology integration solutions 
(feasibility studies, coordination groups, international support) were viewed as 
primary sources for future interoperability at the national and regional levels.    
  Government corruption (e.g., political leadership, law enforcement, etc.) was 
identified by the players as a root cause for the significant levels of drug 
trafficking in the region. Moreover, players concluded a strong disparity between 
political and military desired end state and competing national security strategies. 
Specifically, there was a theoretical and practical divergence in addressing drug 
trafficking as a land vs. maritime issue of concern. Most notably, a majority of the 
players recognized the strong correlation between drug trafficking and corruption, 
submitting that ―it‘s much more effective to interdict narco-traffickers at sea, than 
it is to cut it off at its root cause.‖ Conversely, ―because corruption is influential 
within higher levels of political leadership, it‘s often difficult to obtain the assets, 
resources and funding needed.‖ 
 Players concluded that while the number of bi-lateral partnerships in the region is 






                                                                                                                                                                                           
existing cooperative models (e.g., JIATF-South, UNASUL, etc.) is needed. 
Specifically, players noted that JIATF-South serves as an effective and central 
mechanism for sharing information regionally. However, several players noted 
improvements are needed in the timeliness of actionable data dissemination and 
that they desire to adopt a common operating picture rather than using a chat 
function to identify specific operational positional data.   
Player Recommendations 
 It was highly welcomed and desired by 90%  of the Central/South American 
participants of the participants that the International Chiefs of Navies within the 
Central and South American regions should propose the development of a 
regional information sharing strategy aimed at establishing common data and 
technical protocols, standards, procedures. Several players noted the use of 
existing international organizations (e.g., ROCRAM, IMO, and the Inter-
American Naval Conference) as a means to advance this initiative. Moreover, 
several players noted the integration of national counter narcotics strategies and 
applicable laws into a commonly defined and agreed upon regional strategy 
would allow for shared responsibility and governance.  
 Cell members collectively encouraged CFAC to request section1206 funds from 
SOUTHCOM to establish a regional maritime operations center that can serve as 
a training and maintenance facility and logistical hub in support of counter 
narcotics operations.  
 A regional effort aimed at integrating sub-regional efforts and best practices was 
highly desired by the players.  Players discussed this effort within the context of 
leveraging existing conferences, exercises and games as a means to effectively 















                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Appendix J 
Administration / Logistics 
Background. Lessons learned follow below for the conduct of the Administration and Logistics 
portion of the game.  The team was made up of numerous personnel from various NWC offices,   
instrumental in ensuring the foreign participants were properly hosted: 
NWC Events:  handled all coordination for billeting and also liaised with the 
NEX/Commissary and the base MWR department to ensure foreign officers had full 
access to all amenities while staying aboard NS Newport. 
NWC Travel Office:  handled all travel reservations and orders for foreign participants 
who hailed from countries that were officially funded by the US Navy to attend the game. 
NWC War Gaming Department Comptroller:  assisted by providing funding advice not 
only for foreign travel arrangements, but also hosting events (Officers Club, Viking Bus 
for transportation, etc.). 
Lessons learned listed here are broken down into two groups:  Internal to NWC and/or the War 
Gaming Department and external to the same. 
Internal Lessons Learned: 
1. The timing of the game during the FY changeover created numerous issues both 
internally and externally.  Reserve manning support played a huge role in the success of 
the logistical support of the game.  As it was, orders were slow to be issued due to the 
changeover and therefore quite a few Reservists cancelled their plans to drill with the 
NWC for the game due to a lack of timely issued orders.  This in turn led to the WGD 
planners having to scramble in the last few days leading up to the game IOT secure 
enough drivers to cover the airport/train station requirements without sacrificing safety 
(for abnormally long driving shifts).  Had the game been scheduled two weeks earlier or 
later, more ―solid‖ funding and orders for Reservists could have been identified.  Worst 
case, the need for supplemental help could have been dealt with much sooner and 
therefore would not have been an eleventh-hour call for assistance. 
2. For an event this big, a full-time ―Game Knowledge Management Officer (GKMO)‖ 
should be assigned to attend to the registration website.  Relative to the GMP website 
management, normal primary duties for the NWC IT personnel detracted from being able 
to effectively keep the website up to date and easy to use.  
a. Additionally, the log-in view for the website needs to be more clear and concise.  
Finding information should be a one or two step process – a prospective attendee 
should not have to dig down three to five web pages to find information germane 






                                                                                                                                                                                           
b. Game Net accounts were not set up and ready for users at the beginning of the 
game.  If assigned, the GKMO should be able to easily coordinate this in advance. 
3. The lead for the reservists‘ transportation team needs to be an officer at the paygrade of 
O-4 or at least a very senior and experienced O-3.  Originally, an O-4 was identified, but 
when orders could not be secured in a timely manner this LCDR was unable to commit to 
supporting the game.  There were times when the assigned LTJG was overwhelmed with 
requests from very senior officers from the participating countries and one of the WGD 
O-5s had to step in and speak for him.  Additionally, this LTJG‘s maturity and follow-up 
skills were at times lacking.  Though not a guarantee with a more senior officer assigned, 
a game of this magnitude needs constant focus and attention to detail. 
4. Logistics/Admin was not able to fully support eight early-arrival personnel on Friday (i.e. 
hosting and shuttles into downtown Newport).  While Visitor Handbooks with dining 
information and ―Cab Cards‖ with taxi phone numbers were handed out to arrivals on 
Friday night, dedicated van runs did not pick up until Sunday.  Those who arrived on 
Saturday did not require full transportation support until Sunday (most participants chose 
to retire to their quarters after a full day of travelling).  The Logistics team was able to 
assign a van to make some limited runs during a lull in airport shuttling during the early 
part of Saturday‘s schedule IOT secure dining options for some of the attendees that 
specifically requested it.  More specific direction should be provided to early arrivals in 
future games. 
5. Check-in procedures were complicated by the billeting of personnel at both the Navy 
Chalet and the CBQ requiring drivers to drop off personnel at two different locations and 
then bringing the CBQ billeted personnel back across the bridge to their respective 
buildings.  If at all possible, raise the possibility of registering all personnel on Coasters 
Harbor Island to eliminate the need to shuttle back and forth across the bridge to and 
from BLDG 1312 (CBQ Front Desk). 
6. One source of information and point of contact for all hosting issues is absolutely 
necessary.  Many times misinformation was passed by other offices outside the NWC.  
Sponsors and other stakeholders should be fully aware of the capabilities and limitations 
of the NWC WGD staff in order to prevent duplication of efforts to maximum extent 
possible. 
7. ―End of the Week‖ hosting feedback forms, which have been used in the past, were 
erroneously omitted from this game.  This would have allowed a more thorough review 
of lessons learned and enabled a more easily referenced set of notes to look back on.   
8. Food delivery through the 1st deck loading dock (north/rear side) of MLH was easily 
accomplished throughout the week.  Additionally, food was staged in the back 
passageway of the 2
nd
 deck near the Game Tech offices (vice the patios adjacent to the 






                                                                                                                                                                                           
moving food carts and associated equipment through the halls and distracting the seminar 
cells during the game day. 
External Lessons Learned: 
1. The number one outside issue experienced by the staff for this game was the lack of clear 
situational awareness on who was actually attending.  Bottom line up front – the NWC 
WGD can easily send invitations and thoroughly tracking them. 
a. Positive confirmation (much like ―read receipts‖ with emails) would have been 
extremely valuable in helping to focus the attention of the OPNAV N52 desk 
officers and the various Embassy Naval Attaches on those countries most eagerly 
desired to participate in the game. These factors also served to take the teams‘ 
focus off the final planning of details that normally would have been addressed 
during the final days leading up to the game.  Proper placement of countries into 
appropriate game cells was not accomplished until two days prior to the game due 
to many ―pending‖ participants.  Other issues included final headcounts in order 
to release overbooked rooms back to the Navy Chalet/CBQ and even the internal 
issue concerning early arrivals hosting mentioned above. 
b. Invitations should be tracked and attacked in a 3-prong approach:  First, 
engagement of the OPNAV N52 Desk Officers when the invitations are first 
delivered; Second, contact with  specific country U.S.  naval attaches; and Third, 
as a last measure, the foreign country attaches assigned to embassies in 
Washington, D.C.  Reliance upon the OPNAV N52 desk officers (combined with 
weak follow-up procedures) proved to be an almost single point of catastrophic 
failure in obtaining attendance to this game. 
c. In order to achieve critical game requirement of obtaining the most 
knowledgeable, expert players, , invitations should be sent to be received a 
minimum of 120 days prior to game start.  This would help minimize the effects 
of summer vacation and other various ―out of office‖ responses and therefore give 
sufficient time to track desired attendance (provided positive feedback of 
invitation requests is initiated and pursued from the time the invites are sent out).  
For major international engagement efforts such as this game, an even earlier 
game announcement and invitation are beneficial.  Other countries operate on 
different fiscal and operational cycles than the United States; identifying an 
opportunity for participation a year or more in advance can enable a partner 
nation to optimally plan for and facilitate event attendance:  the right person, 
funded by his government in the most cost-effective manner.  
2. The specific ―funded‖ countries needed to be more apparent to the NWC team.  The list 
of "funded countries" provided at the Final Planning Conference proved to be largely 






                                                                                                                                                                                           
several instances of unnecessary funding decisions due to inadequate communications.  
This presented confusion (about which participants were and were not partially or fully 
funded) throughout the ticketing and the subsequent travel periods for participants, and 
particularly for the CBQ/Newport Chalet bills.  An accurate list was provided toward the 
end of the game execution week that was extremely helpful when participants began to 
check out of CBQ/Newport Chalet accommodations.  It is understood that as OPNAV 
N2/N6—N3/N5 (N52) determined that all the funds allotted towards certain country 
attendance were not going to be utilized, these funds were offered  and thus they went to 
countries that either had initially declined or had not made a solid decision to attend, in 
an effort to increase attendance at the game.  This process of reallocation of funding 
underscores the necessity of a very early invitation process with aggressive follow-up. 
3. In addition to (1) and (2) above, recommend that future games requesting a large number 
of international participants obtain from OPNAV N2/N6—N3/N5 (N52), or other 
sponsor as appropriate, a desired attendance list by country, organization or individual as 
appropriate.    This list, amplified by the reasons for the priorities and the decision 
process for additional invitations well enable the Naval War College, OPNAV Country 
Officers, Combatant Commander or their Naval Component Commander Staffs, U.S. 
Embassy Naval Attaches, and other invitation conduit organizations, such as U.S. 

























AIS Automatic Identification System 
Analysis The abstract separation of a whole into its constituent parts in order to 
study the parts and their relations 
Analytic Framing A detailed sketch or outline of some social phenomenon 
AU African Union 
CAMTES Computer Assisted Maritime Threat Evaluation System 
Catalyst to Instability Anything that initiates, accelerates, or causes an event or series of events 
to adversely impact the safety, security, economy, or environment of a 
nation, region, or super-region.  
CCDR Combatant Commander 
Content Analysis A method whereby a researcher seeks objectively to describe the content 
of communication messages that people have previously produced 
Cross-regional Relating to issues that go beyond a specific geographic area 
CS-21 A Cooperative Strategy for 21
st
 Century Seapower 
C-SIGMA Collaboration in Space for International Global Maritime Awareness 
Data Visualization By comparing and contrasting the players‘ activities provides the ability 
to identify gaps, seams, and overlaps in U.S. Navy actions supporting 
other nations and organizations.  Data Visualization:  the process of 
representing abstract business or scientific data as images that can aid in 
understanding the meaning of the data. – or -- Data visualization is a 
general term used to describe any technology that lets corporate 
executives and other end users ―see‖ data in order to help them better 
understand the information and put it in (a business) context.  
DCAP Data Collection and Analysis Plan 
DCAT Data Collection and Analysis Team 
Deductive That which is deduced or drawn from premises by a process of reasoning; 
an inference; a conclusion 
Dependent Variable A variable in a logical or mathematical expression whose value depends 
on the independent variable 
ECCAS Economic Union of Central African States  






                                                                                                                                                                                           
Ethnographic Data collection that is done through participant observation, interviews, 
questionnaires, etc. 
EU European Union 
Game Sponsor Organization providing the objective and funding for the game 
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council  
GMPG Global Maritime Partnerships Game 
Grounded Theory Directs researchers to look for patterns in data so that they can make 
general statements about the phenomena they examined 
Idiosyncratic An individualizing quality or characteristic of a person or group 
IFC Information Fusion Center 
IMO International Maritime Organization  
Impediment An object, thing, action or situation that causes an obstruction, forms a 
barrier, creates a difficulty, a nuisance or a disorder that prevents 
achievement of concrete goals 
Independent Variable Distinguish between two types of quantities being considered, separating 
them into those available at the start of a process and those being created 
by it, where the latter (dependent variables) are dependent on the former 
(independent variables)  (in research) a variable that is manipulated 
(controlled) by the researcher and evaluated by its measurable effect on the 
dependent variable or variables. 
Inductive A kind of reasoning that draws generalized conclusions from a finite 
collection of specific observations 
Interagency Of or pertaining collectively to the departments and agencies of the U.S. 
Government or the processes and interaction between those departments 
and agencies.  The coordination that occurs between elements of 
Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies, 
nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international 
organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. See also 
international organization; nongovernmental organizations 
IONS Indian Ocean Naval Symposium  
ISPS International Ship and Port Facility Security 
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
ISS International Seapower Symposium 
Maritime Domain All areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on 
a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related 






                                                                                                                                                                                           
Maritime Domain 
Awareness 
The effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime 
domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of 
a nation 
MarView Maritime View 
MSSIS Maritime Safety and Security Information System  
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NETSAFA Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity  
NMIC National Maritime Intelligence Center 
Phenomenological A body of knowledge which relates empirical observations of phenomena 
to each other; based upon a philosophical approach and method of qualitative 
research in which the essence of an experience is sought. 
PRC A Marine, Super Yacht and Defense consultancy offering maritime 
subject matter expertise to the general marine world (This was used?) 
Qualitative  Descriptions or distinctions based on some quality or characteristic rather 
than on some quantity or measured value 
ReCAAP Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery 
Regional Relating to a specific geographic area 
REMIX Regional Maritime Information Exchange 
Sea-blindness 1. No infrastructure available to establish Lack of MDA 
2. Lack of appreciation of the importance of the sea; A lack of political 
and public focus and understanding of important maritime issues, 
resulting in the maritime domain receiving low priority without 
appreciation for the consequences of neglect 
SIEMS Represents vessels at various ports and harbors in the Philippine where it 
loads and discharges cargo and other goods 
SISTRAM Maritime Information Traffic System 
SUCBAS Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea 
Title X A series of major service-sponsored war games that address future 
capabilities in the context of Title X responsibilities to organize, train, and 
equip its forces to carry out its roles and functions as a component of 






                                                                                                                                                                                           
Triangulation Methodology that takes advantage of multiple techniques to derive the 
same or very similar conclusions using different datasets or methods  
VRMTC-A Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Center – Americas 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 
 
 
 
 
